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This thesis will address the potential for an Aristotelian conception of autonomous human 
agency, and its relation to virtue and happiness by exploring Aristotle 's "Physics" and "De 
Anima" (with associated texts). This wi ll require an exploration of Aristotle's treatment of ousia 
or substance, and of the individual as capable of both normative and novel activity within nature. 
For Aristotle all natural beings are in a state of motion, specifically characterized as change in 
the form of generation and decay. There is a necessity within this natural motion that is 
characterized by spontaneity and chance; where the arche of spontaneity is seen as a determined, 
regulative, and automatic motion that is primarily manifest as the efficient and material causes. 
That is, for Aristotle, such actions are, in principle, necessitated as regulative or normative by the 
internally active, differentially integrating motion of nature. Thus, it is always for the sake of 
that sustained identity as its end, its telos, that cause is manifest as formal. 
Novel motion is a capability, a hexis, of the human soul that is indicative of an informed 
independently active and cognitively responsive rational movement that underlies creative 
human actions in the world (the embodied new). That which is genuinely novel or new 
restores/refreshes activity, in that novel action interacts as both creative and supportive of new 
motion within the natural world. This concept of life having internally originating novel 
movement, when considered as a feature of the natural world, can be seen as a kind of freedom 
insofar as it induces new movement and is not merely an effect of spontaneous/normative 
movement. 
The relation between spontaneous/normative and novel motion is especially significant 
with respect to human beings and other living things in that, as technologically skilled, we 
participate in the natural world. When we initiate change or motion we are providing purpose to 
that which we change or move; this represents a source for the new "fresh starts" or new motions 
Aristotle states in his Metaphysics must exist within nature, and thereby must be a capacity or 
potency within, most notably, living substance. 
Thus my process will begin with an exploration of ousia and the natural world in 
Aristotle's "Physics", particularly book two, chapters eight and nine wherein the ground for the 
significance of novel action appears as Aristotle allows for the influence of matter in the natural 
world . This section underscores the interactivity of spontaneous motion within the natural world 
in which some motions support or impede other movements. But this also allows for novel 
action given human reason has the capacity to affect the world through what it knows. I will 
then explore the implication of novel motion for virtue as Aristotle presents it: the nous, insofar 
as it shapes virtuous activity tempered by habit, represents a locus of an Aristotelian conception 
of freedom as autonomy. 
The novel expression of freedom becomes explicit in the overwhelming fact that the 
individual human can choose not to act on his/her knowledge at any time, in that having 
knowledge (specifically virtuous knowledge) does not necessitate such action. 
This exploration will involve some consideration of texts from Aristotle's Nichomachean 
Ethics, with selections from the Parts of Animals, and, finally, the Politics. 
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Introduction and Biography 
I will argue that a conception of human freedom, defined here as autonomous human 
agency, is anticipated by Aristotle's conception of nous and discernable in the active character of 
virtue as Aristotle defines it. 1 I will argue that autonomous human agency is a uniquely human 
expression of activity. While significantly distinct from the automatic activity demonstrated by 
all other living things and of nature in general, it is not mutually exclusive of that automatic 
activity and is, in fact, an expression of the human telos. If my contention is right, and 
autonomous human agency in fact turns out to involve or entail vittue (an~te), then not only do 
we gain a small insight into the significance of the individual's moral responsibility, but we may 
also be able to explore the nature and efficacy of moral failure (akrasia). Autonomous human 
agency could also serve as a revelatory concept that enables one to gain, not so much a deeper 
understanding of Aristotle, but rather a more nuanced understanding that might let us see novel 
change (or newness or creativity) as not only an integral motion within Aristotle's conception of 
nature, but as a significant source of rational knowledge in that humans would therefore be 
capable of engaging in acts that are not determined by the automatic motions of nature. 
When one considers the political volatility of the concept of human freedom, defined as 
the ability to freely choose and to act upon such choices without external interferences, in our 
world today, and the contested roles of autonomous agents, one is forced to consider politics as 
the space where individual freedom is experienced within a collective authority. 2 Entire nations 
1 While the term 'agency' is often equated with the term 'freedom' , it is important to note that this thesis will make a 
subtle but important distinction between them. In short, the term 'freedom' denotes the colloquial understanding of 
autonomous human agency, in that people typically describe themselves as free; i.e., as having the freedom to act 
and to choose for themselves, unrestricted by political, and possibly ethical, influences. In this thesis the term 
'agency' will carry with it the implication of direct involvement by the individual with (and within) the world; thus 
agency implies not only effect but also motion; e.g., when one chooses a course of action one moves in that direction 
in order to achieve the goal the choice aims at, and further, each choice has a definite effect on the world. This will 
be further addressed throughout the thesis. 
2 Arendt, What is Freedom? 
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have been built on enlightenment conceptions of freedom, which perennially come under an 
especially urgent re-examination with respect to the rights, privileges and privacy of the 
individual as against the needs and demands of the state.3 For Aristotle, politics is the highest of 
endeavours: political life is the place where virtuous activity is normative and manifest as that 
which is most required of the individual. While the individual is the place where knowledge and 
virtue are integrated in action it is in political life that the actions of the individual have 
significant and lasting effects on a potentially limitless scale. Indeed, it seems logically 
necessary that humans are indeed free, since without the act of choosing we are left without 
deliberate intent, without which an act cannot be virtuous in that one has not chosen the best 
good for one's self or polity. 
To understand how Aristotle 's conception of virtue implies aspects of what later comes to 
be called "freedom", we must revisit some of Aristotle's even more foundational conceptions: 
substance (ousia), nature (physis), soul (psyche), and mind (nous). I shall begin by exploring 
substance, in chapter one, and its relation with the eternal yet restful (stationary) motion of 
natural and artificial objects, as well as the relation between substance and nature itself. I shall 
rely heavily on Aristotle's Physics and related texts, such as On Generation and Corruption. In 
chapter two I will address Aristotle 's conception of virtue and its connection with the good, 
which will involve a discussion of the soul and of ethics, for which I will rely on Aristotle's De 
Anima and Nichomachean Ethics. In chapter three I will discuss various issues and implications 
of autonomous human agency as a logical process within the human mind and as a revelatory 
concept that will provide an exploration of akrasia and novel motion. 
3 Matthews, The Absolute Violation. 
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Aristotle 
A brief biographical summary is in order to provide context and perspective for the 
political and philosophical implications I want to draw out. I rely upon Richard McKeon's 
summary of Aristotle's life in the introduction to his The Basic Works of Aristotle. Aristotle was 
born in the Greek city of Stageria on the Macedonian Chalcidice peninsula, in 384bce.4 His 
father, Nichomachus, was court physician to the Macedonian royal family, and Aristotle's 
formation clearly included an emphasis in medicine and biology, which he would carry with him 
his entire life. In 367bce Nichomachus sent Aristotle to Athens to study with Plato, where he 
stayed for twenty years as both a student and as a teacher. 5 
After Plato's death (in 34 7bce ), Aristotle left Athens to pursue his scientific interests, 
traveling extensively through Greece and Asia Minor while studying flora and fauna and 
pursuing several other intellectual research projects for approximately eleven years. In 
approximately 342bce Aristotle was invited by Philip II, King of Macedon, to tutor his son 
Alexander, later to be hailed as Alexander the Great, whose conquests were to establish an 
empire whose Greek political values and aspirations were to set the course of much later western 
history.6 
After Alexander conquered Athens, Aristotle returned there in 335bce and set up a school 
of his own known as the Lyceum, where he lectured and conducted collaborative research on a 
great many topics including philosophy, psychology, biology and most of what, today, we 





Macedonian rule and reestablished its own independence.7 As a result, Aristotle's already 
precarious political position, given his history with Alexander and Philip II, suddenly became 
dangerous as various Athenian political opponents took the opportunity to move against him. 
The sophists, Eurymedon and I socrates, filed the infamous charges of heresy and corruption 
against Aristotle, and to avoid being put to death, Aristotle fled to the island of Euboea reportedly 
saying, "I will not let Athens sin against Philosophy twice" . It was on Euboea, less than one year 
later, that Aristotle died of natural causes in March, 322bce. 
The heart of the charges against Aristotle claim that he was morally responsible for the 
immoral actions his students were undettaking as a direct result of his teachings. This in turn 
presented a kind of moral threat to the general public. The central issue then is whether or not 
Aristotle, or anyone else, can be held morally responsible for their actions and for the actions of 
others. It would stand to reason that if autonomous hwnan agency exists and moral 
responsibility can be ascribed to it, then any person could, in principle, be considered morally 
responsible of their actions. 
Certain key issues recur in our reading of Aristotle's writing in all the various fields from 
biology to politics, logic, physics, and beyond. Today, we talk about Aristotle as everywhere 
trying to w1derstand the relation between what he calls "universals" and what is particular, or 
individual, where the necessary individual is conceived as substance. In many ways, Aristotle is 
no different from the philosophers who came before him, like Thales and Heraclitus, who were 
also seeking to understand the relation between the universal and particular. 
Though Thales and Heraclitus also had a conception of substance, it is clear that Aristotle 
perfected this concept, beginning with his logical works, collectively known as The Organon. 
7 Ibid. 
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What distinguishes Aristotle from those that came before him is his methodology and his tenacity 
in exploring the implications and problems inherent in his own standpoint, using his method to 
play "devil 's advocate" in order to test one set of theories against others by exploring their 
implications. It is these moments of intense examination that show Aristotle as not dogmatically 
asserting one argument over another in favour of any personal prejudices. They also show how 
he not only thoroughly engaged with those arguments that have come before him, but how he 
was also as thoroughly critical of various aspects of the problems of his own standpoint as well. 
Given Aristotle's methodology and reputation for precision, it is difficult to conceive that 
Aristotle did not address the issue of human freedom. That said, we must consider the fact that 
perhaps as much as two thirds of Aristotle's original works have been lost, but what has survived 
did so in manuscripts of varying degrees of accuracy, lecture notes, and student conm1entaries. 
These texts have been the subject of problematic translations, causing some confusion that I shall 
have to consider in this study. It is important to be clear that this thesis is not a political treatise 
on Aristotle's work, but explores Aristotle's conception ofvi1iue as informed by an implicit, and 
perhaps unacknowledged, kind of freedom that nonetheless has implications for the life of the 
individual, and perhaps for any polity that may be open to virtuous acts. 
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Chapter One: Substance & Nature 
1.1: "The old question raised anew." 
For Aristotle, the Greek term 'ousia', often Latinized into English as 'substance', denotes 
the most basic event, or instance, of real ity, or "being" or whatever is, that is capable of analysis. 
Aristotle argues that inquiry into substance (ousia) will enable one to understand the relation 
between the universal and the particular: Aristotle concludes that "being" is revealed as the 
answer to his question "what was it to be?" or in ancient Greek, "to lien einai ". That phrase is 
often translated by another Latinised English term, 'essence'. Strictly speaking, the word 
'essence', defined as describing the fundamental composition or truth of a thing, does not 
properly capture Aristotle's meaning, in that the original Greek phrase translates as "the what? 
was it to be", which includes three concepts that 'essence' does not include: of a temporal context, 
of motion, and of active analysis. 8 As the tortured Greek phrase "the what was it to be?" suggests, 
Aristotle unpacks the Greek term ousia to suggest that substance is a being in that its past ("was") 
implicates its infinitive ("to be"), and that it can be analyzed. Substance, for Aristotle, is 
therefore defined, in part at least, by its past actions, a theme which is explored throughout this 
thesis. The questioning aspect of the interrogative pronoun, 'what?', is Aristotle's way of 
emphasizing this tense-defying dialectical character of substance.9 
Since, for Aristotle, substance is the most basic instance of reality capable of analysis, 
then we might therefore anticipate that if, for Aristotle, there is a conception of autonomous 
human agency or freedom within his philosophy, it will likely be a property, power or capacity 
that stands either as an aspect of substance or in some relation to substance. 
8 Analytics Book 2, Ch 6, 92a7 cf 82b37-39 and Bonitz Index Aristotelicus at p.763b line 49- 765a line 6 and Meta 
Book 7 (Zeta) 9, I 034a30 and I 037a33 . Also, Richard Hope's glossary entry under ho logos ho lou ti en einai which 
gives "what-it-meant-to-be-something' in his book Aristotle's Physics, newly translated, U. Nebraska Press 1961 
(p.208). 
9 Organon 7 1 b I Off. 
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Aristotle is not particularly interested in treating "existence" as a property of things that 
are, nor does he wish to discuss substance ( ousia) in relation to non-existence. Aristotle is 
primarily interested in what is, what exists 10; that is, Aristotle is seeking a way to analyze reality. 
Aristotle treats substance ( ousia) as an event that is, itself, an act that occurs, and which can, in 
proper methodological conditions, be named and subsequently analyzed. Thus, for Aristotle, 
scientific knowledge involves what he calls "demonstration" which is his preferred procedure for 
revealing the core dynamics at work within each substance ( ousia), in that, for Aristotle, 
substance as substance embodies activity. 
If we are to demonstrate a substance as Aristotle does, by involving its prope11ies, then 
we must examine how he sees the relation between properties and substances. More particularly 
for my purposes in this study, if Aristotle recognizes autonomous human agency, we will need to 
see how a particular substance, human substance, involves nature, nous, movement, and change: 
names that we often predicate as human properties. 
Since Aristotle argues that substance ( ousia) is an activity, or centre of activity, an act, he 
argues that, in its primary state, substance is not passive and can be understood with respect to 
movement, change, and its relation within nature. 11 To explain this, Aristotle focuses in the 
Organon on the aspect of activity inherent to the phrase ' to ti en einai', which catches the motion 
that reveals substance as an existent thing, something that stands out as particular, or 
individual. 12 Aristotle does not conceive of substance as incapable of being experienced; it is 
manifest within nature in multiple varieties. As such, substance can be studied, analyzed, 
understood (or misunderstood) through debate and study. 
10 Meta 19034a30 If. 
11 Organon 2a 13-19, Physics 192b26ff, 193a27- 29, and 192b9-19. Also, Meta Book V, Ch 15 and Book IX. 
12 Organon lb3-9, 2all-13. 
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Given the various possible meanings of the word 'activity', it is important that we 
understand how Aristotle is using the term, and how he justifies the claim that substance ( ousia) 
is activity. Generally, Aristotle underscores substance as activity to emphasize that it exists as 
that which can have an affect, and, in certain circumstances, do so on its own and without itself 
being affected. The latter concept shall be explored later in this thesis, for now it is enough to 
say that it is central to the possibilities of autonomous human agency. Substance understood as 
an event or act suggests that what is occurring now is at least as significant as the results of such 
acts. More specifically, to see a living substance as an individual event completed within itself is 
to see its activity as purposeful, as telos. 
Aristotle asserts that his scientific method must be applied in a very specific manner in 
order for anyone to come to understand nature and substance (particularly living substance). The 
scientist/phronimos must begin by studying universal or general properties and capacities, then 
proceed to analyze specific parts, while keeping in mind the relation of the parts to the whole 
that they comprise. 13 One's analysis begins by studying the genus of living substances (e.g. 
animals), then one narrows one's focus to a given species (humans) and then finally focusing on 
a specific individual within the species (one person). 14 This enables one to understand that 
studying the part is really the study of the whole that part comprises, and the specific role the 
part plays within its given whole. Thus, when Aristotle discusses the nature of substance he 
begins by exploring the nature of being as an existent, moving on to consider existence as 
activity, then to the specific purposive act as an event. All of which, while general, is 
nonetheless a narrowing from universals to particulars. 
" ... when any one of the parts or structure, be it which it may, is under discussion 
13 The Parts of Animals Book I, Ch 5. 
14 The Parts of Animals 645a31-37, 645b20-28. 
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it must not be supposed that it is its material composition to which attention is 
being directed or which is the object of the discussion, but the relation of such 
parts to the total form. Similarly, the true object of architecture is not bricks, 
mortar, or timber, but the house; and so the principle object of natural philosophy 
is not the material elements, but their composition, and the totality of the form, 
independently of which they have no existence."15 
Accordingly for Aristotle, the scientific method is based upon the analysis of the purpose of each 
part within the whole they uniformly constitute.16 
Aristotle sees substance in terms of its being for its own sake; i.e., substance acts for its 
own good, its own interests, serving to achieve its own goals in the best ways for it to do so. 
These goals are always good for substance itself, in that they are actions that enable substance to 
come to be and to continue to be as it is, which accords with what I have previously said 
concerning the fact that "being" ("the what? was it to be") is Aristotle's main scientific and 
philosophic focus. 17 Achieving its own goals (to be as it is in the best way for it to do so) is a 
good for any given substance; and in the case of humans, that achievement constitutes the 
eudaimonia (happiness) that, for Aristotle, normatively defines the human condition. 18 
Aristotle qualifies and expands the concept of activity with the term energia to further 
explain the activity of substance as being for itself. 19 Energia is a Greek term meaning 
"function", where the root of the word is 'ergon' (meaning task, job, or work), suggesting an 
immanent ongoing functionality. 2° For Aristotle, substance ( ousia) acts for itself, and thus 
already involves the concept of self-integrating purpose. This focus on the individual self 
15 Ibid. 
16 The Parts of Animals 645bl4-19. 
17 P. l 0-11. 
18 l will expand more on the normative human condition throughout this chapter, and I shall address eudaimonia in 
chapter two. 
19 LSJ - Physics 257b8, and Meta l050a23. 
20 Ibid. 
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emphasizes the importance of the continuous activity of being as internal or immanent?' This 
internal activity remains internal, relying upon nothing external to it, and is in constant motion. 
Substance then, for Aristotle, is actively self-fulfilling and self-reliant as that which is engaged in 
the act of being of itself, where each natural substance is separate (i.e. as individual) from all 
other substances as centres of activity. Thus, such a being is, in a very real significant sense, its 
doing.22 Since substance does not rely upon any external forces or other substances to be itself 
then it follows that substance is, with respect to its being, autonomous. This provides an 
excellent starting point for further exploration of the possibilities of autonomous human agency. 
It is "within" the natural world that Aristotle sees substances interact, and where we will be able 
to expand upon Aristotle's conception of substance. 
1.2: Form and Matter 
In order to understand how Aristotle conceives of nature as the locus of substantial 
interaction, we must be clear about how Aristotle defines "form" and "matter". Aristotle 
describes substance as a union of form and matter, where, in their ultimate simplicity, form is 
pure actuality and matter is pure potentiality.23 Matter is the basic "stuff' of nature defined by its 
capacity to be( come) anything. Since form provides both specificity and purpose to matter, it is 
pure actuality. Form is act and matter is the power to be, to change, and to enact. Of course, 
form and matter as such cannot exist separately; since each is dependent upon the other, form 
and matter are separable only in thought and not in being. Because matter does not have to be 
anything (lacking definition, purpose or actuality), it will not, by itself, change to become any 
21 Physics 192b26ff. 
22 Organon 2a 13-19. 
23 Meta I 042b9-1 043a30. 
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particular object; matter is informed by form. It follows that form is universally active yet lacks 
power, while matter has the power to be any specific thing yet lacks the differential integration 
required to specify its intensifying telos (its completion); i.e., it lacks direction or motivation. 
The relation between form and matter can be seen as the relation between the universal and the 
individual respectively.24 But it can also be seen in other ways as well, as we will see. 
Since form needs matter to become something and thus necessitates it (i.e., form 
provides motion towards an end, or goal), it follows that form depends upon matter as that which 
is capable of accommodating or having (hexis), or suffering (paschein), or accepting (being 
affected by) the active form to become something. In short, the relation between form and 
matter provides that substance is self-sufficient (autarchies), relying only upon itself. But if this 
self-reliance is indeed autonomous, what is the nature of this universal/individual, 
material/formal relationship within substance? 
While matter gains purpose to be something particular, form, in turn, is fully actualized in 
that for it to be truly "actual" it must be embodied in matter so as to enact its goals. Form, 
considered by itself, is an activity that requires something to act upon (which cannot be itself), 
that has the capacity to receive actuality and to enact the form (hexis). It follows that substance 
both is and does: which is to say, that substance is itself a kind of Heraclitean change within 
nature, and that its union is characterized as an active unity of self-sufficiency and self-reliance.25 
Still, it is not quite enough to consider the relation between form and matter as an "activity". 
This can be too abstract for a clear understanding; so another way of understanding form and 
24 Aristotle frequently uses the word 'individual ' in place of'particular ' to emphasize the embodied nature of 
~?rticular things (Organon 2a 11-26, Meta I 043a2-30, and I 0 17b I 0-25). 
'Given this understanding of form as actuality, is it somewhat debatable as to whether or not form is "pure" 
actuality given that it obviously lacks matter, but this is rather a confusion caused by our modem conception of 
'actuality' as being that which is wholly complete and dependent only upon itself; i.e., to be actual is to be a fully 
concretely real substance. Form is pure actuality in that it provides purpose. In that sense, then, it is completely 
whole and dependent upon nothing else for that capacity. 
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matter is to see their relation as the realized movement from potentiality to actuality: as an act. 
The movement from the potential to the actual is characterized by two Greek words: 
'dunamis' and 'energia' respectively. Given that energia is an internal active functionality, we 
can draw a link to form in that it, as a function, has the power to do. Energia is contrasted with 
dunamis (cf English 'dynamic'), which is that which can be/become something, and thus can be 
linked with matter?6 Energia and dunamis are jointly substance, in action. 
In his book The Idea ofThe Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy 27, Gadamer 
explains this purposive (telic) integration by calling on Plato's term 'methexis' as it is used in the 
Philebus and elsewhere. Methexis is often translated as "participation" to express Plato's (and 
Gadamer's) understanding of how the part interacts with the whole. More specifically, the part 
stands in unity with the whole, but is nonetheless distinct from it.28 Insofar as the part is what it 
is, both as to its form and matter, the part is simultaneously integrated harmoniously with other 
parts to function as the whole. We know that the part is differentiated from the whole within 
which it participates because we can name it and come to w1derstand dialectically how it 
influences the whole. That is, as argued earlier, form and matter are always w1ified as substance, 
and are separable in thought only.29 To borrow a phrase from Hegel, who was intimately 
acquainted with Plato 's and Aristotle's thought, the whole which the part comprises stands as a 
26 Aristotle also had another word for Energ ia, in Greek it was 'entelecheia' (alternative spelling, 'Intelecheia'), or 
'entelechy' in English. Entelecheia refened to the specific aspect of energia to be complete within itself, its own 
fulfillment with respect to the being of a thing. Aristotle s imply stopped using the word for this was implied with 
energia, but in the earlier books it helped to focus in on such an aspect to aid in communicating understanding. It 
must be noted that while Aristotle treats entelecheia as interchangeable with energia, the latter term emphasizes 
actuality as a "realization" (Irwin & Fine's Aristotle: Selections, Hackett Publihsing 1995. p. l20 footnote 3, and 
Glossary entry p.565 note I). 
27 Hereafter refened to as The Good. 
28 Gadamer, The Good I 0- 11. 
29 P.14. 
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unity in distinction.30 
The immanent activity of substance is what Aristotle also calls the substance's principle 
(arch e) "of motion and stationariness", or rest. 31 Rest has two important meanings here: first, 
"rest" does not so much mean lack of motion but that the completed, informed, motion of 
substance is stable and in that sense unchanging and at rest. This restfulness is itself a state of 
motion that could also be characterized as a calm state of readiness, or preparedness, to engage in 
more active motion. For example, a skilled archer who has just fired an arrow at a target stands 
at rest; the state of rest integrates the archer's prior act of firing with the subsequent act, and so 
the archer acquires the character as "archer". This restful stability is contrasted to the untrained 
archer whose movements betray the uncompleted or unstable acts of someone who is not yet, and 
may never be, an "archer". 
The second sense of the term 'rest' , is that it represents a purposive limit that growth 
observes in the enacted embodiment; e.g., a man's nose will only grow so far and then stop. That 
is, since substance is a complete unity it needs nothing further to determine its integration; it is 
its own center of activity, and determines its own motion. Substance "stays within itself'. It is 
not hypothetical. Substance does not depend on any external principle to be what it is in order to 
do what it does. This motion is an activity that determines where it moves, its goal; but it also 
determines where it stops. If a living substance (say, a bear) gets hungry then the bear htmts and 
feeds accordingly, and when it is sated it stops eating, having achieved its goal. In a simpler 
sense, the bear can move from one point within its den to another point and then stop moving: no 
external force is required by the bear to move. 
There is another sense of rest that we must consider, and it involves a wider ranging 
30 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion p.391 ff, 404ff, and 411 ff. 
31 Physics Book II , ChI, 192b12ff. 
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implication. That is, the bear, as a species, lives in climates that are cold and dangerous. In 
order to survive, bears have thick warm fur with strong skin that provides adequate protection 
from the envirorunent. The length and thickness of its fur are just enough to enable the bear to 
survive in its chosen envirorunent. What is imp01iant to note is that the growth of fur stops at a 
certain point, not growing so long as to hinder the bear; a bear's fur is not so long that it 
overheats in the summer or so short that it freezes in the winter. The length of the bear's fur 
represents a state of telic rest that is indicative of the bear enabling itself, as a substance, to 
remain within itself. 
It is clear that substance, for Aristotle, is causally autonomous with respect to its own 
being, but what remains to be seen is if this autonomy is indeed linked with substance's inner 
principle of motion and rest. 
1.3: Nature and Change 
For Aristotle, substance exists as a multitude of individuals as separate substances that 
interact within nature, and involves the Greek word 'physis' (cf., English 'physics'). Physis is 
normally translated by the English word "nature", it is drawn from a Greek word meaning "to 
grow" from birth, thus nature/physis is, for Aristotle, that which lets something's action originate. 
Aristotle argues that nature is purposive, as belonging to "the class of causes which act for the 
sake of something".32 So, like substance, this act of generation is actively self-
unfolding/reliant/fulfilling in that nature relies on nothing external to it.33 
Aristotle divides into genus and species in order to better understand nature. The term 
32 Physics 198bl0-ll , and 199a7-8. 
33 Meta 1014bl6-1015a20. 
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'genus' is derived from the Greek word 'gen', primarily meaning "to generate or give birth".34 
Aristotle draws on this meaning, attributing to the structure of realty the capacity of active self-
generation and change.35 In the Physics, Aristotle portrays "nature" as a centre of activity that 
mediates between a natural thing's form and its specific event; i.e. , nature 's activity lies between 
the universal and the particular, between and within the enacted embodiment of substance, its 
form and matter. 36 Since we know that, for Aristotle, substance is self-sufficient/reliant and, to 
some degree, causally autonomous, we can conclude that the activity of nature is the same: 
however, this does not completely describe nature as it is not itself a substance. 
The term ' nature ' can refer variously to the characteristics of a thing, or to a group of 
things, or a person, or to the entirety of physical objects as a whole. 37 Aristotle adds that nature 
"is the immediate material substratum of things which have in themselves a principle of motion 
or change"; that is, substance. 38 Aristotle uses the Greek term 'hypokeimenon ' ('substratum' in 
Latin), defined as the underlying base or foundation of a thing(s), to emphasize that nature is the 
locus of substance. In order to elaborate upon what Aristotle means by "material substratum", 
we must discuss the difference between natural substances and artificial objects, and the latter's 
relation to the human artisan. 
Nature is contrasted with that which is artificial, or man-made and is not normally found 
in nature.39 Thus, artificial objects do not contain their own principles of motion or change, as 
they are dependent upon human agency for their actuality: 
"'By Nature' the animals and their parts exist, and the plants and the simple 
34 The "phy" in " physis" is the "grow" root, but the "gen" really is the "birth" root. 
35 The Greeks could capture both passive and active senses simultaneously in what is called the "middle voice". 
36 Physics 180a 12. 
37 Physics 192b-193b20. In other words, the term 'nature ' can be used in the effort to exp lain a ll things except, 
~erhaps, for God/Divinity. 
8 Physics 193a27- 29. 
39 Physics 192bff. 
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bodies (earth, fire, air, water) - for we say that these and the like exist ' by nature '. 
All [these] things mentioned present a feature in which they differ from things 
which are not constituted by nature. Each of them has within itself a principle of 
motion and of stationariness. On the other hand, a bed and a coat and anything 
else of that sort, qua receiving these designations - i.e. in so far as they are 
products of art - have no innate impulse to change."40 
Aristotle's conception of "innate principle of motion and stationariness" represents one of 
Aristotle 's most influential concepts, and, as such, is key to understanding nature, its relation to 
substance and change, and, as we shall see in Chapters Two and Three, to understanding the 
possibilities of autonomous human agency. By arguing that nature mediates the activity of 
substance, Aristotle is also arguing (particularly in Metaphysics Book XII) that nature has its 
own arc he of motion and rest, which indeed it must if it is to mediate between the form of 
substance and the specific event of substance. Since Aristotle underscores the fact that both 
substance and nature are whole within themselves and need not seek purely mechanical 
completion through external forces or principles, it follows that the mediation (the active relation) 
that occurs within natural substances does not undermine their individual immanent acts, but is 
complementary 41 That is to say that the immanent self- reliant activity within substance 
complements the self-reliant activity of nature, demonstrated in the activity of the latter in 
allowing the former to come to be and act independently (i.e. offering no impediment to 
substance as it acts in the best ways for it to do so). 
Keeping in mind that all substances are centres of activity, it appears that nature 
maintains this multitude of individuals through the mediating power of its normative, regulative 
motion that allows for the differentiation between individuals, where this motion can be 
characterized as change. That is, the motion of nature is such that it creates and maintains what 
40 Physics 192b9-19. 
41 Meta 1014bl6ff, and Physics Books VIII and IX. 
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is individual. Nature does not seek to homogenize all substances into one single substance nor to 
destroy all substance in general. 
What is key to understand from this normative and regulative motion of nature is that the 
activity of substance, while on the one hand subject to these motions, is in principle never 
prevented from engaging with and in itself; substance is always individual. We can further 
conclude that substance is therefore causally autonomous with respect to its being (of itself) and 
its individuality. Moreover, we can conclude that Aristotle's inner principle of motion and rest is 
the individual substance's principle of causal autonomous agency. Nothing external is required. 
In so far as substances are self-sufficient individuals defined in their unified finality, they 
are not immutable nor, if they are living substances, immorta1.42 Aristotle views change as a 
kind of motion, so we must now explore how he understands both motion and change in order to 
see how substances interact within the natural world and within themselves. 
First we will consider motion ("kinesis" in Greek) which Aristotle defines is a ' from to ' 
movement that forms the basis of all motion within nature as the relation between being and 
becoming, the actual and the potential, form and matter.43 For example, the seed moves from 
being a seed to becoming a flower, which in turn produces more seeds. The seed is actual in that 
it is a seed, but participates as actual in a flower's becoming; thus, the movement from the 
potential to the actual is when the seed grows into (becomes) the flower, where the flower can be 
seen as the fu lly actualized (or fulfillment of) the seed. With respect to being and becoming, the 
seed is a seed completely and wholly, but then it moves to become the flower; the seed is both 
gone and yet remains in that the end or purpose of the seed is to become the flower. This 
42 I use the term "unified" here in a limited sense to focus on the fact that substance is one, a complete whole 
without moveable parts. Substance is not a harmony of separable parts that comprise a thing in the same way that 
the gears, cogs, springs and metal casing comprise the timepiece. Form and matter are separable only in thought and 
not in actuality per se (p. 14-15). 
43 Physics 193bl8-19. 
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regularly repeated movement, which Aristotle sees as purposeful in its pattern, is often seen as a 
process and underscores the continual active nature of motion. 44 It follows that nature is a 
motion that is purposeful, which is at once its self-unfolding, but it is also a cause of change.45 
When a thing achieves its final cause then it is complete, and all of its actions can be said 
to have integrated with its properties and powers (which makes it easier to observe, analyze and 
explain): this is what, in animate context, Aristotle calls a thing's "virtue" (arete). That is, arete 
refers to a thing's capability (hexis) to achieve its purpose for itself, in that when it performs such 
acts then it has demonstrated its excellence or perfection in achieving its own final and defining 
purpose.46 Since we have already noted that substance is autonomous with respect to its being, it 
follows that a thing's virtue (arete, excellence) is also autonomous from external causes.47 Thus, 
when a thing achieves its purpose for itself then it also demonstrates its own autonomy.48 But 
does it make any sense to extend autonomy to humans and what they do or make? 
We must explore what, exactly, the human purpose or end is if we are ever to uncover the 
possibility for autonomous human agency. In light of how Aristotle defines substance as an act, 
and that a thing is, in some sense, its doing, then we can begin our analysis by exploring the 
various activities that humans engage in.49 Perhaps one of the most important activities humans 
engage in is the manufacturing of artificial objects. Generally speaking, artificial objects are 
centres of activity in that they are (they exist), and that they are individual. However, artificial 
objects do not have within themselves their own principle of motion/stationariness, thus they are 
markedly different from natural substances since any motion they undertake is given to them 
44 Physics 199a9-19. 
45 Physics 198bff. 
46 LSJ238 a & b, and EN 1106al5ff. 
47 P.l3 . 
48 To what degree substance achieves its own autonomy, if indeed we can say such a thing and make sense, will be 
explored later. 
49 P.l 0-11. 
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from external cause. In a way, artificial objects are already actualized in that they serve a 
purpose (such as a tool), but since they did not come into existence naturally, nor are they able to 
innately come into their completion through natural motion, they are only ever partially 
actualized given they are only sometimes engaged in the activity of their intended purpose, 
which may or may not occur. 
Thus the fulfillment of artificial objects exists primarily as potential despite its actuality 
as the object itself. That is, the original activity of the parts of the artificial objects (the wood of 
the bed, the steel of the hammer) has thus been changed into another, and not so accidentally but 
purposely (where that purpose is given as the normative good for the craftsman and not for the 
tool itself). As they now compose an artificial object, they rely upon the external forces brought 
by the craftsmen, or other users, for their completion. 5° For example, the wood of a tree is made 
into a bed, but, if left alone, the tree (and subsequently the wood) will not become a bed, nor will 
the bed grow into a tree if planted. Accordingly, the bed is only actually and fully a bed when 
someone is using it as such, thereby completing it. Further, to use a hammer as a paper weight is 
perfectly acceptable given its weight and size, but it is best used to hammer nails into wood. As 
such, artificial artifacts seen especially in tools, are not autonomous given that they require the 
actions of a human user (external motion) in order to achieve their arete (excellence). The 
hammer's purpose is finally and perfectly explained when it is used to hammer. 51 
It follows that the human artisan is a causally autonomous agent with respect to their 
crafting activity due to the fact that the artisan is that for the sake of which the crafted product 
exist. That is, given the artisan's products are artificial objects that require their completion 
50 The word 'accidentally' here is used in the modem sense, and not in the Aristotelian sense (which views that 
which as accidental as both essential and necessary). Thus the tree is a bed in so far as someone sleeps in it not 
because it is also a bed: the end of the tree is "tree" not "bed". 
51 Physics 199a 15-19. 
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through human acts, it follows that the human artisan has defined the shape and scope of 
activities said product(s) have and can engage in order to achieve their m-ete. Properly speaking, 
the w·ete of artificial objects participate simultaneously in the arete of the human artisan and user. 
The agency of the human artisan is seen in the fact that nothing external to the artisan determines 
the shape or function of their craft per se, given the actions of the artisan are done to suit specific 
circumstances in order to achieve the artisan's own goals. 
Sara Waterlow, in her book entitled Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle's Physics, 
argues that humans are indeed autonomous casual agents with respect to their crafting. Waterlow 
states that it is the artisan's inner principle of motion and stationariness that determines the 
artisan as autonomous, given the artisan (or artificer) has the capacity to bring about a change in 
something other then himself. 52 Waterlow explains: 
"As artificer stands to the artificially induced change, so natural substance stands 
to natural change, except that in the former case the source and the subject of 
change are different, save per accidens, while in the latter they are necessarily the 
same ... Now following the analogy, we find that a natural substance gives rise to 
change from "within" itself not merely in the sense that it, being the kind of thing 
that it is, helps to determine the changes occurring in it, so that under the same 
conditions it would change in a different way from a substance of some other kind. 
For the craftsman (as we ordinarily view such a one) is causally autonomous as 
regards his caftsmanly activities, in the following sense: he dictates the shape and 
pattern of the change he brings about and the object or new situation thereby 
produced. He adapts his activity to the particular circumstances, but the way in 
which they are allowed to influence the pattern of production is determined by his 
objective. They play no part in shaping the overall form of change, only being 
harnessed to realize a form already determined. What kind of change takes place 
depends on the craftsman and his purpose, and the external conditions are 
relevant only insofar as they make possible change of that kind."53 
Waterlow is arguing that while the changes caused by nature that affect natural 
substances are wholly determined by nature, the artisan has the capacity to cause new motions 
52 Waterlow, Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle 's Physics 27. 
53 Waterlow, Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle 's Physics 28. 
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embodied in his crafts. This element of novelty is significant, and we shall return to it in chapter 
three. Water! ow further explains that the motion of nature, while not interfering or altering the 
innate activity of substance, allows for substance to exist as it is by determining the external 
conditions of the "actual occurrence [of change] at a given time and place". 54 Thus, nature, as 
the material substratum, provides a complementary motion that enables natural substances to be 
as they are. It seems clear that Waterlow's statements support gthe conclusion that the human 
artisan, as with natural substances in general, has the capacity, at least to some extent, to 
determine the types of changes they are capable of undergoing and initiating by virtue of their 
innate principle of motion and stationariness. It is clear that this motion is also purposive, and 
that with respect to the human artisan, it is deliberate. 
Aristotle asserts that since artificial objects come to be from some art or techne and not 
from nature, then they come to be from the actions of an agent: "It is absurd to suppose that 
purpose is not present because we do not observe the agent deliberating. Art (techne) does not 
deliberate" .55 The artificial objects produced through crafting are determined to be as they are 
only by the artisan, and subsequently characterized by the artificial object's innate inability to 
shape its own arete. It follows that the human artisan determines any activity or changes that 
occur; thus, the human artisan is an autonomous agent with respect to his craft (techne). 
But much the same could be argued for activities engaged in by the beaver. A beaver can 
swim and hunt, but a beaver is not a beaver unless it builds a dam, its home, to facilitate both its 
own survival and to exert a degree of control over its immediate environment. Being able to 
perform its distinguishing act (dam building) may, then, prompt us to ask whether that act is 
somehow the beaver's final cause: has the beaver expressed a defining behavior unique to it that 
54 Ibid. 
55 Physics 199b27-33. 
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is its own expression of actions that are good for it to do? It is clear that such acts do aid it to 
achieve its even more completely final good, flourishing as its own being through survival and 
reproduction. It follows that there are grades of actuality, of finality. One can say that by 
achieving its purpose the beaver has demonstrated the capacity to achieve its final purpose 
without the causal reliance on any other creature or thing. 
In a sense then, the beaver is autonomous in so far as it is able to achieve its final 
purpose, indicating the fact that there is an element of failure present (the beaver may be unable 
to build its dam), which we shall see later as crucial to the possibility of autonomous human 
agency. That said, we must continue to explore the nature of purposive movement in order to 
explore the possibility that autonomous human agency is somehow different from the 
autonomous agency demonstrated by other living substances. In order to do this we must first 
explore change with respect to normative and random movement. 
Before continuing, I should summarize what has been discussed thus far. We know that, 
for Aristotle, substance is composed, as a methexis, of a unity of form of matter. Nature is that 
which mediates the movement of substances as the material substratum, in that nature does not 
interfere in the activity of substance actively being for itself. Both substance and nature are 
actively self-reliant, relying on nothing external to be as they are. We know that, for Aristotle, 
there is a purposive motion to substance and nature which involves generation and change. We 
know also that substance is causally autonomous with respect to its being and its individuality 
and that Aristotle's inner principle of motion and rest is the principle of causal autonomous 
agency for both substance and nature. We have also discussed how nature maintains the 
multitude of causally autonomous substances through the mediating power of its normative 
motion, which is in turn characterized as change. 
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We have also discussed how when a thing achieves its final cause then it is complete, and 
that all of its actions can be said to have integrated with its properties and powers, thus 
constituting a its virtue (arete). A given substance's virtue is distinct from the incomplete virtue 
of an artificial object, as seen in a human artisan's product (such as a hammer). The human 
artisan is not only causally autonomous with respects to its being (given that it is a substance), 
but the human artisan is also a causally autonomous agent with respect to his crafting given that 
the artisan is that for the sake of which the product exists (i.e., the artisan 's products receive their 
purpose and subsequent completion through human activity). 
Since we have discussed motion and change we must now explore the normative motions 
of nature with respect to spontaneous and chance motion, and then consider purposive agency 
before we move on to discuss the purpose or end of humans and the possibilities of autonomous 
hwnan agency. 
1.4: Spontaneity and Chance. 
In so far as the four causes govern the motion of change within nature, the normative 
motions (what determines the thing's good) the causes enact within the world can be understood 
to occur either spontaneously or by chance. 56 Aristotle defines spontaneity in almost exactly 
opposite terms to its use in modern English: today, the spontaneous connotes the occurrence or 
growth of something from nature (natural processes) that is accidental, not intended, random, or 
has no recognizable origin. For Aristotle, the arche of spontaneity is the determined, regulative, 
and automatic motion within nature, primarily manifest as the efficient and material causes 
56 Physics l94b 16ff. 
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though including all four. 57 Thus, for Aristotle, the term 'spontaneity' represents the chains of 
cause and effect that are the automatic and necessary natural motions of the world (nature) that 
differentially integrates all substances. 
For example, in living substance, when the acorn falls from the tree it is determined by 
nature to sprout, take root, grow into an oak tree, create more seeds, and then wither and die. 
The acorn will not grow into any other object other than an oak tree. We can then see that 
spontaneous (normative) motion can give rise to other, further normative motions. That is, an 
oak tree will grow dozens of acorns that will grow into oak trees, giving rise to even more 
spontaneous (normative) motions. 58 So we can see that spontaneous motion can, in principle, be 
predicted with a relative high degree of accuracy in the light of these normative automatic 
motions. 
Chance motion is essentially the opposite of spontaneous (normative) motion, though 
they are not mutually exclusive, and has two distinct meanings for Aristotle. The first meaning 
of "chance" refers to motions that occur seemingly without cause and are considered to be 
indefinite, occurring incidentally. 59 Chance occurrences can be conceived as being random, but 
as potentially being definite if their cause can be discovered.60 It is important to note that chance 
motion results from the spontaneous (normative) motion of nature: without normative motion 
there can be no chance events.61 
57 Physics II, 3. 
58 With respect to non-living substances, chemical reactions (as when hydrogen comes in contact with oxygen) are 
determined as necessari ly havi ng a determined or automatic outcome (H20), which can in tum create more 
spontaneous motion (such as when sufficient heat is applied to water to create steam which is the efficient cause of 
the transition between liquid and gaseous states). 
59 Physics l96b 17-34. 
60 Physics 196bl7-34, and 197bl -3 . Today we could invoke mathematical laws ofprobabi lity to approximate 
predictable chance occurrences; but certainly such predictions will not apply as a causal primary nor historically 
justified description . 
61 This understanding of chance motion also means that in any given spontaneous (normative) motion there is an 
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The second meaning of chance for Aristotle refers to motions that occur as a coincidental 
result of actions undertaken by intelligent moral agents that can nonetheless be understood to 
occur "for the sake of something".62 Aristotle asserts that while some events occur normatively 
(through the necessary movement of nature), and some due to random chance (as just discussed), 
some occur "for the sake of something". 63 Aristotle asserts that whenever intelligent moral 
agents act, they do so "for the sake of something". But if the intended actions result in 
something unexpected (or something additional occurs which was unexpected), either beneficial 
or harmful, such unexpected events are considered to occur by chance.64 Aristotle calls these 
chance results incidental to the initial deliberate purpose of the originating actions, and further 
argues that, " intelligent reflection ... and chance are in the same sphere, for purpose implies 
intelligent reflection". 65 Accordingly, for Aristotle, chance is thereby an incidental cause, not a 
primary cause per se, and will thereby always be posterior to both nature and intelligence.66 
Both spontaneity and chance stand in relation to one another: chance necessarily 
originates within spontaneous (normative) motion, but not vice-versa, since chance can create a 
series of effects and thereby "begin" a series of events that are incidentally governed by the 
normative motion of nature.67 More can be said concerning chance motion with respect to moral 
agents. Indeed, we must explore chance motion to see if there is any possibility for autonomous 
human agency, but first we must finish our exploration of substance and purposive human acts. 
element of chance. 
62 Physics 196bl0-197bl3. 
63 Physics 196b 17-24. 
64 Physics 196b25-197a4. We will explore the existence and powers of moral agents who act "for the sake of 
something" in Chapter Two and Three, for now we must focus on those actions considered to occur "by chance". 
65 Physics 197a5-8. Aristotle also calls chance in this case, "fortune" or " luck" ( 197a25-35). 
66 Physics 197a8-14, and 198a9-12. 
67 Physics 197a Iff. 
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1.5: Purposive Agency 
There is no guarantee that substance will always be able to achieve its final cause since 
motions of other substances might impede or prevent its flourishing. For example, a human 
could harvest all of the oak tree 's acorns and burn them in a bonfire, so we can say that in one 
sense the tree has fulfilled its purpose of being itself (growing from acorn into tree) and 
reproducing itself; but in another sense it has not completely achieved its purpose since none of 
its acorns have been able to take root. There is also the possibility that a chance occurrence, such 
as an automobile accident, will result in the death of a human before he can achieve happiness. 
Aristotle points out that there is no deductive proof possible for kinesis, and that it would 
be absurd to attempt to prove nature 's unfolding motion.68 The recognition that nature is self-
unfolding is inductive, epagogic. This is to say that it requires a form of ostensive demonstration, 
which is understood as the concept that something obvious does not immediately strike us 
precisely because it seems far too commonplace (or simplistic) to be significant.69 That is, 
because something is commonly obvious, we tend to ignore it as a given, and pay it no focused, 
conscious attention. This focus problem or inattentiveness can affect our understanding of 
substance and nature and requires that our scientific method compensate for it. 
It is through education that one can recognize the epagogic, and it is to education we 
must now briefly look. The student can be seen to be incomplete in that he has not been able to 
achieve virtue (the perfection of character) naturally on his own, and requires the teacher (an 
68 Physics !93a 1-6. Further, one must take it for granted, that is to say that we must assume that nature is mind-
independent(l85al 2). 
69 This belief is ca lled ' apodeixis ' in Greek, which means, "that which is self-evident", certa in or obvious, thu what 
can be known is in evidence all around us. For example, it is known that every human breathes in order to live, but 
we tend to "gloss over" or ignore this fact, i.e., not consciously recognize the continual act of breathing others 
engage in all around us all the time. We do this so much that we tend even to ignore our own breathing. 
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education in general) to complete himself. 70 This acquisition of virtue (or principle of self-
originated action) would properly involve a study of Aristotle's psychology (as set out in the De 
Anima) and his conception of human completion in happiness (as set out in the Ethics). But for 
our immediate purposes here it is enough to note that, while humans have, according to Aristotle, 
within themselves their own inner principle of motion/stationariness, they nonetheless are 
capable of affecting and changing that principle as we will explore more fully in the next chapter. 
Since, for Aristotle, humans as natural substances have their own inner principle of 
motion/stationariness, it follows that humans are also their own ends, their own final causes. For 
example, as mentioned previously, we give purpose to the hammer when we use it to hammer 
things. Left unused by the craftsman, the hammer will not engage in the activity of hammering; 
its potential is one that involves being acted upon by something else (the craftsman) to fulfill an 
external end. Though this at first appears to be applicable only to artificial things, we can easily 
extend this to natural substances; e.g., we can use a tree for our own ends as a bed, or we can 
chop it up and use it as firewood or to build a house. Extending this argument further, it can be 
said that humans are their own masters (causal autonomous agents) that are also able to treat 
themselves and others as tools. 71 It follows from this that ends can be fulfilled or unfulfilled; the 
seed can be burned and never actually become a tree, the hammer never used, or the human to 
fail to act as a human. And although we can use things for our own ends, those ends need not 
necessarily interfere with the normatively natural end of the things used; slaves can be freed. 
When we craft an artificial thing, or come to know any natural substance (thereby 
participating with its motion in the world) we do so in respect of the four causes, on which 
Aristotle relies to achieve such knowledge; i.e. we provide matter with the necessity and power 
70 EN Books Vl-VII. 
71 Politics, Book I. 
Morrison 31 
to be and to do its task.72 The four causes governing change allows us to stand in relation to 
those things that we create as that which initiated their movement and their coming to be, but we 
do not provide a sustaining activity except in respect of the initiation of movement as purpose. 
In certain circumstances, what we craft, like cities and states and other technologies, can also be 
seen to have purpose arising in their own action, thereby implicating us in its quasi-natural 
spontaneity. 73 
We can conclude from everything we have discussed thus far that substances are sources 
of both spontaneous (normative) and chance motion and change, and are thereby causes of their 
being. Substances are causally autonomous with respect to their being, and intelligent 
substances (humans) are, in addition, autonomous agents with respect to their crafts (techne). 
Further, substances have the capacity to instill purpose in other substances through various 
modes of reproduction and artificial production, most notably living substances. 74 
Living substances not only provide purpose to things to achieve their ends but they also 
can provide opportunity for their offspring to acquire, within themselves, the shared purpose of 
their being. 75 Thus, given that humans are causal agents of both natural substances and artificial 
objects, it follows that humans can be causal sources of spontaneous motion. We can also 
conclude that all substances that have an innate principle of motion and rest are thereby causal 
autonomous agents within nature. 
The question to be explored in the next chapter is this: is the causal autonomous agency 
demonstrated by humans in their crafting (techne) indicative of a larger principle of human 
72 This is of course only possible in so far as one is capable of acquiring knowledge; if one has the paideia or general 
education (EN 1130b25-29, and I 094b3, also Politics 1288 1 Off). 
73 It is clear from Heidegger's work that he drew upon Aristotle's conception of purpose arising in technology out of 
their pa11ial quasi-natural spontaneity. (Most notably in his article entitled The Question Concerning Technology, 
wherein he warns against the dangers of technology that can trap and bind human autonomy.) 
74 De Anima, Book li Chp 4 ( 415a 15ff). 
75 EN books VI -VII. 
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autonomous agency that is somehow differentiated from the autonomous agency demonstrated 
by all other substances that have within them an inner principle of motion and rest? If this is so, 
we will also need to determine if it is somehow a natural power to act. These questions will open 
the possibility that humans, as rational beings, can engage in acts that are not determined by the 
mechanistic normative motions of nature. We will see the possibility for autonomous human 
agency becoming clearer, in that humans, unlike other living substances, are neither constrained 
to, nor prevented from, producing other natural or mtificial objects. 
We must now consider the nature of virtue, its relation to the soul, and the possibilities 
surrounding autonomous human agency. 
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Chapter Two: Virtue & Agency 
2.1: Virtue 
Aristotle's concept of virtue (arete) is at once both simple and complex. Simply put, the 
highest virtue is an activity of the soul that enables the individual to achieve happiness 
(eudaimonia), and is a capacity (hexis) that, in principle, all humans can possess.76 I say "in 
principle" since, even though humans as a species have the potential to be virtuous and happy, 
many individuals nonetheless lack the opportunities to act out of this potential, such as those who 
do not benefit from a fundamental education (paideia) and/or prosperity. In addition, given that 
some humans are born with or suffer reduced capacities that prevent them from doing those acts 
that constitute the virtues, it follows that not everyone will actually achieve happiness. 
Aristotle begins his Nichomachean Ethics 77 : 
"Every art (techne) and every inquiry (methodos) , and similarly every action 
(praxis) and pursuit (prohaeresis) , is thought to aim at some good; and for this 
reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a 
certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products 
apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the 
actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, as 
there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the 
medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of 
economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity- as bridle-
making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the 
art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way 
other arts fall under yet others- in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be 
preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the 
latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities themselves are 
the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in the case 
of the sciences just mentioned"78 
Aristotle concludes these opening remarks by arguing for eudaimonia as the universal 
human good; "If, then, there is some end ofthe things we do, which we desire for its own sake 
76 EN 1097aff, IIOObi0-22, 1103aff, 1102a5-6, and 1114b26-1115a3. 
77 Hereafter referred to as the EN 
78 EN 1094a. 
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(everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the 
sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire 
would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good".79 Thus, the 
distinctly human good is happiness (eudaimonia), which results in the individual "living well and 
doing well", but only in so far as it is pursued for its own sake. 
Despite the fact that Aristotle identifies the human good as eudaimonia, "the good", he 
does not present this condition as an emotional or intellectual contentment or satisfaction, nor is 
it a physical sensation of bliss or pleasure: rather, Aristotle uses the Greek word ' eudaimonia ' to 
connote flourishing. The "happy" individual flourishes as he lives, attaining fulfillment through 
his achievement of those acts in accordance with virtue that completes the best possible life, the 
good. 80 Eudaimonia is portrayed as denoting a condition of a natural being that is well 
integrated within itself; that is, within the necessities afforded by one's own innate defining 
properties and capacities as discussed above in chapter one. 81 Such "happiness" is applicable not 
only to human life as a whole but it is achievable by individual human beings, resulting in the 
integrated individual becoming happy. 82 
Thus, when Aristotle's theory of natural substance is taken into consideration it becomes 
clear that each human has the potential to flourish individually in his or her own way: i.e., when 
an individual human achieves his purpose (the "that for the sake of which" they are) in his own 
way that is best for him, then he flourishes accordingly. Aristotle further argues that happiness 
must be achievable and sustainable by humanity through action, and that it must be achieved for 
79 Ibid. 
80 The tenn 'eudaimonia' has strong platonic echoes (as seen especially in the Symposium). 
81 De Anima 402b 17ff. 
82 EN 1095al5-20. 
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its own sake, otherwise happiness can be mistaken or lost from view. 83 
Given that there are different sources of happiness (e.g. wealth, pleasure, honour, etc.), 
Aristotle explores whether there is some principle of economy among them, and which, if any, of 
these many possible goods are the most important. He argues that one must have been raised 
with those habits that are conducive to learning in order to understand the nature ofhappiness.84 
That is, while wealth can bring happiness, such a possible source of happiness can be lost or 
taken away upon loss of one's wealth. Further, since one tries to become wealthy in order to 
become happy it is clear that wealth is pursued for something else (happiness), and not for itself. 
So it follows that the good does not consist in wealth. Aristotle provides similar arguments to 
show that the good does not consist either in honor or in pleasure since neither of these are 
desired in their own right and for themselves. Only happiness (eudaimonia) fits the criterion of 
self-sufficiency. It follows that happiness pursued for its own sake is then considered a final 
good as the best/final end. 
Since happiness is self-sufficient and does not depend upon anything else to justify its 
attainment, the act that attains this happiness must be the sustaining activity that humans can 
engage in. 85 Since virtue and happiness depend upon human actions, but specifically natural 
actions, that can, in some part, be learned, then Aristotle is emphasizing the fact that the 
individual can acquire virtue and happiness. 86 Therefore, happiness is further understood as that 
which makes "life desirable and lacking in nothing"; it is that in virtue of which one is said to 
flourish. 87 Given that humans are causally autonomous according to their being as living 
83 EN 1097al5-1097b. 
84 EN 1095bl-6. 
85 EN I 097b7ff, and II OOb I 0-22. 
86 EN I 099b20-24. 
87 Ibid. 
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substances, and that virtue and happiness are achievable, then we can see a promising possibility 
for autonomous human agency. 88 That is, if happiness is indeed achievable through human 
action, then there is an element of autonomy to virtue and happiness that seems to accord with 
human agency. What must be established is whether there is a link between the human causal 
autonomous agency, and virtue and happiness. We must therefore explore how Aristotle 
conceives of virtue and happiness in this regard. 
Aristotle spends a good deal of time dealing with various interpretations of happiness and 
the virtuous acts that may provide for its attainment, including pleasure and external goods 
(which Aristotle states are tools, friends, riches, clothing, shelter, education, and political 
power). 89 While there are separate arguments for and against both pleasure (physical and 
intellectual) and external goods as resulting in happiness, Aristotle argues that to be happy one 
must have both in order to lead a happy and virtuous life: this is what Aristotle calls 
"prosperity" .90 So, in order for one to achieve happiness and flourish one requires certain 
external goods, the opportunity to pursue actions that will enable one to flourish, the proper 
habits (hexis) conducive to learning, a fundamental education (paideia), and some sort of training 
or education in virtue. 
Still, it is not quite enough to understand that prosperity and some kind of training in 
virtue are required for the acquisition of virtue and happiness. We must ask how the individual 
human is capable of this acquisition, and also, how humanity is capable of differentiating 
between those actions that are virtuous from the unvirtuous. Aristotle points out that since 
humanity shares many capacities in common with other living things (growth, nutrition, etc.) 
88 P.l6ff. 
89 EN 1099bl-9. These good are considered "external" in that they are replaceable and changeable goods 
contrasted to the " internal" goods of intellectual and moral virtues. 
90 Ibid. 
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except reason, it follows that what is good for humanity must be a function unique to it that 
involves rational thought and w1ique hwnan acts.91 This allows Aristotle to conclude that the 
function of hwnanity is an activity undertaken by the rational aspect of the soul, differentiating it 
from the souls and the activity of other living creatures given humanity's unique possession of 
the "rational element" and deliberation.92 This rational human activity is then undertaken "in 
accordance with virtue" (an~te, "excellence") in a complete life as the best and most self-
sufficient.93 Reason is further demonstrable through the human capacity of speech, an ability 
that no other animal possesses.94 Speech is capable of finding knowledge through discourse, 
with one's self and with others, and is thereby capable of communicating knowledge to others.95 
Since we have covered what virtue is, we must be clear on what virtue is not. Aristotle 
argues that if virtue were an already established human faculty then hwnanity would already be 
virtuous and happy to the greatest extent possible, which cannot be the case since not only are we 
inquiring about it, but it is also clear that a great many people are not happy.96 And if some 
people are not happy, then how would it be possible to form contrary (unnatural) habits and 
capacities?97 
Aristotle rejects any claims that virtue and happiness are gained randomly or are 
blessings provided by the gods. If virtue were determined by chance, then such a source would 
be irrational and inconsistent with the manner in which virtue is actually expressed, i.e., through 
rational deliberation. If virtue were randomly acquired by chance, then virtue and happiness 
91 EN I 097b23-l 098a20. 
92 Ibid. We will fully explore the human soul in the next section. 
93 EN I 098a5-19. 
94 Organon I a 17-1 b9, and De fnterpretatione 16a3-8. 
95 This shall be expanded upon throughout the thesis. 
96 EN 1103bll-13. 
97 EN 1102bl4-20. 
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would not be self-sufficient since they would be relying upon something else to be somehow the 
means of their instantiation within an individual. The same objection stands if an individual 
were granted the blessings ofthe gods to be virtuous and happy. In both cases an individual 
would somehow gain the innate and explicit knowledge of virtue who would then benefit from it 
(i.e., become happy) by exercising it. 
If virtue were not based upon and attainable through reason and rational action then we 
would be unable to deliberate on our actions, so that people would be able to engage in virtuous 
acts without thinking about them (before or after their performance). This would result in the 
inability to recognize virtuous (or vicious) actions. Virtuous human actions would therefore be 
instinctual, much in the same manner that a beaver is driven to build a dam. In such cases, virtue 
could not be virtuous, in that it would represent the automatic normative activity of nature.98 If 
virtue originated in being granted either by chance or by divine blessing, happiness could not be 
something that all of humanity could/would strive to achieve for its own sake. 99 
Since virtue is an activity of the soul that requires rational deliberation by the individual, 
I contend that it is in the relation between reason and virtue that we will find the key to 
autonomous human agency: namely, in virtue as the arete (perfection) of reason. 100 The Greek 
term 'm·ete ', which I have here translated in the traditional way, as "virtue", is commonly 
translated today as 'excellence', and denotes a particular power for doing something. 101 It 
follows that virtue is the best activity that any human can engage in. 102 Perhaps, in order to show 
the differentiation between human autonomous agency and all other living substances we will 
98 Further, it is clear that humanity does not possess an internal or external organ that produces and regulates virtue 
in the same manner than the pancreas produces insulin or the heart circulates blood. That said, the implications of a 
"virtue transplant" (or a virtuectomy!) would revolutionize politics. 
99 Ibid. This is not to be confused with blessedness, as that primarily involves prosperity. 
100 EN 1097b23- 1098a20 (life requiring a rational element). 
101 P.21-2. 
102 EN 1097al5-1097b22, and 1098al7-19. 
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need to call the agency humanity possesses as either reasonable or rational autonomous human 
agency. For such a term to point out anything significant, we will need to explore reason and its 
implications for human virtue and happiness. 
2.2: The Reasonable Soul 
Since virtue enables the soul to act we must explore the various capacities and powers 
that Aristotle attributes to the soul that, while different, stand in relation with the others. 103 Due 
to the focus of this thesis on reason and the possibilities of autonomous human agency, I wi 11 
focus only on the faculties of desire and movement, and the intellect or nous. 104 
Desire and movement is a faculty of the human soul that involves all other faculties and 
capacities, in that each of them has an object(s) that we desire to move towards as ends. 105 
Desire and the capacity to initiate movement is a major feature of living creatures given that they 
are natural substances that have within them an innate principle of motion and rest; i.e., they can 
choose to move towards an object they desire. 106 Also, to desire an object is itself a movement 
towards that object which is neither wholly physical nor present, which is characterized as a 
purposive kinetic 'from ... to . .. ' motion. For example, with respect to nutrition we desire food 
to eat which then enables us to reproduce and ensure that our species survives; but even though 
there can be nothing edible directly before us we can still desire it, so in a way, the very thought 
of food causes us to desire. 
In a wider sense, to have an object before one's self is to desire it (or not) to some degree; 
103 De Anima 413a32ff. 
104 While I do not explore all the various faculties of the soul I feel it necessary to list them: nutrition and generation 
( 415a 15ff), sensation/perception ( 417aff), common sense (sensus comunis) ( 418aff), imagination (phastasia) 
(427b25ff), desire and movement (433aff), and the intellect or nous (429aff). 
105 De Anima 433a9ff. For example, food is the object of desire for nutrition and generation. 
106 DeAnima433bl5-30. 
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and when we desire we initiate within ourselves a movement towards (or away from) those 
objects as ends, where the movement away from the object is itself desired. Desire, in a sense, 
occupies the position between thinking (as potential) and doing (as actual) with respect to a 
"wanting to do"; and because this is a motion towards something it hints at a relation to the final 
cause of a thing, given we desire things as ends for a purpose with respect to our being. Aristotle 
argues that there is no one source or cause of desire and movement; the cause of movement is 
desire as mediated by reason and reflection. It follows that desire is involved with all of the 
soul's faculties and powers, mediated by reason, and is thereby a function of the whole soul. 107 
It is important to note that desire is an impulse and is subject to deliberation as being 
good to enact before engaged in by the individual. Since humans are not only capable of 
desiring movement but also capable of reflecting upon those desires and reasonably deliberating 
upon natural impulses to arrive at a specific judgment, this then leads us to consider the intellect 
or nous. Aristotle has two senses of the term no us: first, no us is the power of immediate 
perception of self-evident truths; and, secondly, it refers specifically to the human capacity to 
think reasonably for reasonable purposes.108 Thus, for Aristotle, because the nous provides the 
capacity to reason, thereby setting humanity apart from all other animals as having the capacity 
to reflect upon and analyze one's choices (deliberate), it follows that humans alone can 
determine the best course of action to take fulfill their ends. 
We can also conclude that the soul is the human inner principle of motion and rest, given 
107 De Anima 423b3ff. 
108 De Anima 429al Off, and 429a20-30. When Aristotle says "self-evident truths" he is referring to those axioms 
that are logically self-evident, such as the principle of non-contradiction. 
Fwther, The nous is divided into a passive intellect and an active intellect. The passive intellect is that aspect of 
the mind that passively receives sense impressions and forms (De Anima 430a 15). The passive intellect is the 
source of images, sensory appearance and the experience of sensation. The active intellect takes the forms provided 
by the passive intellect and then abstracts them, which to say that it takes them and produces an apprehension of the 
forms which is in turn governed by the active reason: the mind is thereby both passive and active s imultaneously 
(De Anima 429a 14-19). 
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that it controls the body by providing purposive motion. 109 More specifically, the soul is the 
forrnlenergia of the individual human while the physical body is its matterldunamis. 11 0 Thus, if 
we are to find rational autonomous human agency then it follows that it will involve the human 
soul and requires further investigation. 
Aristotle characterizes the human soul as being divided into two elements with regard to 
the various acts it does and can perform, the irrational and rationa1. 111 The irrational element of 
the soul is further divided up into two elements, the nutritive and appetitive, which work in 
tension but are nonetheless complementary with the rational element of the soul. 11 2 The 
irrational element acts in ways that are contrary to the rational element, but the irrational element 
can still function "with reason", in that the objects it desires (e.g., food) can be recognized as 
good (for instance, in that they sustain life); but it is still properly to be regarded as irrational in 
that it tends always to move towards excess or defect (e.g. over or under-nourishing), as well as 
deeming bad objects good for the purposes of immediate satisfaction and pleasure (e.g., eating a 
chocolate sundae just because it tastes good). 113 This is seen in the incontinent (inconsistent) 
individual, who chooses both good things virtuously and bad things un-virtuously, i.e. , ignorantly 
deciding they are good. 114 Thus, while contraries, the irrational and rational elements of the soul 
are not mutually exclusive: in fact the irrational and the rational are unified (methexis) within the 
soul. 
That these two elements are unified (methexis) within the soul is of fundamental 
109 De Anima 412al8-412b9, 413b27-29. 
110 De Anima 412a-413b29. 
111 EN II 02a26tf. 
11 2 Ibid. 
11 3 
How this relates to Aristotle 's conception of the mean is discussed in the following section. 
114 EN II 02b 13-22. 
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importance. Aristotle argues that the rational informs and restrains the irrational. 115 The various 
elements of the soul, like form and matter for substance, unify to create the soul; that is, the 
rational, as form, "forms" the irrational as matter and is thereby a unified whole. 116 Just as 
substance is nothing without form and matter so to is the soul nothing without its irrational and 
rational elements. Just as the natural object requires its place within the natural world, so to do 
the irrational and rational elements require the soul. 
2.3: Intellectual and Moral Virtue 
Since we know that the human soul is rational and that our actions are undertaken in 
accordance with virtue for the purpose of achieving happiness/flourishing, it is now important to 
explore virtue in order to understand how it entails human excellence/an?te. In the EN, Aristotle 
differentiates virtue into two fundamental elements: the intellectual and the moral. 11 7 Aristotle 
asserts that intellectual and moral virtues are not innate to humanity, rather, humanity possesses 
(hexis) the capability of achieving them through virtuous habits.11 8 Intellectual virtue is 
exemplified in philosophic wisdom, practical wisdom, and understanding, while moral virtue is 
exemplified in liberality (generosity and kindness) and temperance (moderation and self-
restraint). 119 Intellectual virtue is honed through life experience and scientific education, which, 
when combined with training in philosophy and political science, one learns of the benefits of 
rational analysis and of human governance. 120 Moral virtue must come about through the 
inculcation of virtuous habits (or acquisition of various virtues), and depends on the individual 's 
115 EN 1102b34-1103a2. 
11 6 Since the irrational aspect of the soul desires without rational control it can be equated with matter in that the 
rational aspect must inform it. Once unified, the individual can rationally enact their desires and purposes. 
117 EN 1103a3-IO. 
118 EN 1103al4-25. 
11 9 Ibid. 
120 EN II 03a 14-20. I wi II explore how habits are acquired later in this section. 
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reasonable (phronesis) deliberation and pursuit or choice of (prohaeresis) the acts (praxis) that 
result. 121 
To better understand the distinct relation between intellectual and moral virtue, we must 
first explore the two Greek terms 'phronesis' and 'prohaeresis '. Gadamer argues that Aristotle 
defines the Greek term phronesis as a knowing how to do a given activity in order to achieve 
happiness, and prohaeresis as choice. 122 Aristotle uses the term phronesis to name a kind of 
knowledge different from the "skill" conveyed in the Greek term ' techne'. Phronesis is 
knowledge of practical matters and actions that are achieved through deliberation. 123 
What distinguishes techne from the practical action of phronesis is that the latter relates 
to a given action that is chosen to achieve a purpose (such as happiness), while the former relates 
to achieving an external physical good, e.g., a tool, a table, or some similar hypothetical or 
instrumental good. Further, whereas a techne is learned before performing the associated acts 
and can be subsequently perfected, acts that flow from phronesis cannot be learned prior to their 
performance, but must first be deliberated upon and then performed or enacted. 124 The learning 
that leads to phronesis consists, therefore, in practices or activities, in that one learns how to 
enact such actions properly. Thus we have a focus on both act and purpose as functions of the 
individual. Phronesis is only successfully achieved when it is done on one's own, and not on the 
initiative, or in imitation, of someone else. 
While prohaeresis translates as 'choice ' in English, there are subtler nuances for Aristotle 
we must explore. For Aristotle, choosing is giving preference to one thing over another thing 
based on reasonable deliberation. So, a person who chooses correctly based on such deliberation 
12 1 Ibid. 
122 Gadamer, The Good pp.33-6, and 163-5. 
123 EN 11 39b25ff, and I 14Jbl2. 
124 EN 1103a26- 1103b22. 
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is considered to have practical wisdom, but only in so far as such a choice is reasonable and only 
if it results in the desired effect of achieving and/or maintaining "the good life" for the one 
choosing. 125 
Prohaeresis and phronesis are related in that the latter informs the capacity of the former 
to determine the action intended to bring about a good. Thus, when one rationally deliberates 
about engaging in an action intended to bring about a good, one must ultimately choose to prefer 
one action over any other; whichever action one judges will result in the most appropriate good. 
When one is virtuous, one has been able not only to choose the best and most appropriate action 
to do at any given time, but one is capable of doing the action well (succeed). The actuality is 
substantial. 
Effectively, one must teach ones sel[when such actions are appropriate to enact, and how 
to enact them well enough that the desired virtuous outcome results. This then is the element of 
knowledge that Aristotle asserts must be taught and learned, but it is not, in principle, teachable 
in the same sense that math or carpentry is teachable. That is, it is clear that while virtue can be 
taught and learned for one's self, the learning its not acquired in the same way as a techne nor in 
the way claimed by the Sophists: it is self-originating and oriented learning undertaken by the 
individual. 
Since, as we have seen the good for Aristotle is "that at which all things aim", it follows 
that we can characterize the relation between phronesis and prohaeresis as the act of deliberate 
judging, of choosing in accordance with what determines. In so far as a teacher can help instill 
knowledge that aids the individual in deliberating, it is ultimately the individual who must 
choose and then act, refining both dynamics to suit what is best for him or herself. This brings 
125 EN 1139b25-33. 
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us to consider habit and character insofar as practical wisdom (phronesis) and choice 
(prohaeresis) contributes to their formation. 
The Greek word 'ethos' is the origin ofthe English word ' ethics' .126 Aristotle sees the 
virtue of practical wisdom (phronesis) as that state of character achieved by human activity 
through reasonable (phronesis) deliberate choice (prohaeresis). 127 In general terms, such virtue 
is a potential (hex is) that is actualized in the proper exercise of reason that develops one's 
character: since it depends upon reason (rational deliberation), a faculty that all humans possess, 
it follows that all humans can become virtuous.128 It also fo llows that virtue is a self-originating 
action that is deliberately chosen by the individual human and that, virtue is acquired, it arises 
J' . 129 
out o1 vzrtuous acts. 
This leads us to consider how it is that the intellect or nous can relate to human action and 
the acquisition of virtuous habits. First, Aristotle points out that the intellectual aspect of the soul 
discussed previously is divided up into two aspects: the scientific and the calculative.130 Both 
aspects deliberate, but Aristotle asserts that since no one can deliberate about invariable things 
then the calculative intellect is that aspect that "grasps a rational principle". 13 1 This is important 
to virtue in that the intellect or nous is that which informs and enables the human capacity to 
make judgments and to choose. Aristotle asserts that not only is virtue "relative to its proper 
work", but that there are "three things in the soul which control action and truth - sensation 
reason, [and] desire" . 132 Sensation, while providing sense data, does not originate action but the 
126 EN 1103a l5-20. 
127 EN 1103a l 5.ff. 
128 EN I 099b 14-24. 
129 EN 1103b20-25. 
130 EN 11 38b35- 11 39a l5. 
131 EN 11 39al 2- 16. 
132 EN 11 39al6- 18. 
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latter two do, in that Aristotle also asserts that "since moral virtue is a state of character 
concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true 
and the desire right, if the choice is to be good". 133 Further: 
"Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is 
contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth 
and falsity respectively (for this is the work of everything intellectual); while of 
the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement 
with right desire. The origin of action - its efficient, not its final cause - is choice, 
and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This is why 
choice catmot exist either without reason and intellect or without a moral state." 134 
Aristotle goes on to argue that the intellect itself does not move anything as efficient 
cause per se, rather, only when it aims at achieving a specific goal "and is practical". 135 That is, 
when the intellect involves production of artificial objects it is therefore practical, characterized 
by the fact that "good action is an end, and desire aims at this". 136 This leads Aristotle to 
conclude that choice is either "desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire, and such an origin of 
action is a man".137 
From what has been said, we can conclude that the relation between intellectual and 
moral virtues is a unity within the human soul. In so far as intellectual virtue is the honing of 
knowledge, moral virtue represents the application of such knowledge, which cannot be anything 
but the completion of a natural act. 138 Thus, intellectual and moral virtues are unified (methexis) 
within the human soul, mediated by nous as that which enables rational thought and deliberation, 
subsequently the potentially vitiuous person can choose those virtuous habits that he or she 
133 EN 1139a2l-25. 
134 EN 1139a26-31 . 
135 EN 1139a35-1139b5. 
136 Ibid. 
137 EN 1139b3-5. 
138 EN 1099b18-24. 
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judges will result in achieving virtue, and eventually happiness, when enacted. 139 What is crucial 
is that humans are capable of learning through their actions: specifically, humans can learn how 
to consistently apply their choices successfully, as well as communicate and deliberate using 
speech with one's self and with others. One deliberates with one's self conceptually within the 
nous, and one can engage in verbal and written communication with others in the form of 
debates and lectures. 
While it may seem that we have found a distinctly rational autonomous human agency 
that enables humanity to be free agents to both themselves and nature, we must nonetheless 
realize that there are several points that need clarification. For all that has been said we have yet 
to discuss how humans choose and we need to examine whether or not humans have the capacity 
to actually choose. Specifically, we need to explore, A) virtue in relation to Aristotle 's 
conception ofthe "mean", B) the nature of the possession (hexis) of virtue, C) whether or not 
knowledge can be non-coercive, and lastly, D) the power of the individual human to effect 
change in nature and themselves. How virtue relates to the mean will complete this section 
while the other issues will be addressed in the remaining three sections ofthis chapter 
respectively. 
How virtue relates to Aristotle's conception of the "mean" is important as it involves how 
humans choose. Aristotle himself relates vit1ue to his conception of the mean, defined as the 
reasonable balance between extremes, such as courage being the mean of braslmess and 
cowardice. 140 Thus, we can say that virtue is the mean (intermediate) between the two extremes 
(vices) of dogmatic resolve (dictatorial adherence to principles and laws) and fickleness 
139 EN 1103a3-10, and 1143bl7-1145al2. 
140 EN 1106a14ff. 
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(inconsistent judgments based on one's changeable whims). 141 That said, one must choose the 
virtuous mean in opposition to vice through reasonable deliberation so as to find the best goods 
available, and successfully enact them. 142 
"Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e, 
the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that 
principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a 
mean between two vices, that which depends on excess or defect; and again it is a 
mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both 
passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is 
intermediate. Hence in respect of its substance and the definition which states its 
essence vittue is a mean, with regard to what is best and right an extreme". 143 
It is critical and relevant to questions of autonomous agency to note that one must 
succeed in the proper application of the chosen virtuous act, given there is no guarantee of 
success. 144 Success leads to an?te/excellence through a process of learning how to enact virtue 
better with each enactment. Further, the agent must be "of a certain mind" to benefit from 
engaging in virtuous acts (i.e., gain virtue): the agent must first have knowledge of the action 
being virtuous, they must not only choose the act but do so for its own sake, and lastly, the action 
must proceed from a "firm and unchangeable character". 145 
Aristotle places clear emphasis on the act of choosing and on the enacting of the agent's 
purposive choice, which in turn must originate from confidence born of deliberated knowledge. 
So, reason, disciplined by a preliminary education ('paideia' in Greek or 'schooling' in English), 
patience, and prosperity, will, for the most part, enable the individual to become virtuous and to 
141 Examples would be the Sophists and Hedonists respectively. 
142 When Aristotle speaks about excess or defect within human actions we are involved with moral vi1tue, 
accordingly such actions are considered vices, while virtues are their mean. Thus, the inculcation of virtuous habits 
help to prevent us from engaging in the vices of excess and defect (EN II 06b..b). 
143 EN 1107al -8. 
144 EN II 03al5ff, and ll06b28-35. One is reminded of techne here, but this will be explored in section 2.5. 
145 EN II 04b30-ll 05A. It should be noted that the firm and unchangeable character is partially developed and 
suppo1ted by one's paideia. 
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achieve happiness through the proper use and enactment of choice. 146 In a sense then, the 
training in virtue that one requires is simultaneously one that is received from teachers, gained 
partly from one's paideia, and extensively from one's life experience. Is the choice that Aristotle 
explores here proof of autonomous human agency? Almost, but not quite. 
Given what we have said concerning virtue as an act of the soul, it follows that actions in 
accordance with virtues complete the soul's natural capacities to act, mold, and perfect human 
excellence, tempered by reason and deliberation. That there is an element of choice is, as I have 
said, both intellectually intriguing and, ultimately, necessary. That is, if virtue is to be considered 
a state or disposition of the soul, tempered by reason, to act in certain ways, then this requires the 
capacity of judging, of reasonable deliberation (itself tempered by education) in order to 
recognize the good, and subsequent virtue, of the acts and habits. Further, as I stated at the 
beginning of this thesis, without the act of choosing (prohaeresis) we are left without deliberate 
intent, without which the act cannot be virtuous in that one has not chosen the best good for 
one's self. 147 Thus, when one is virtuous, one has attained a state of excellence or perfection 
with regard to practical reason (phronesis), thereby gaining practical wisdom (and living the 
good life). To use Aristotle's analogy of the archer: without choice, the archer cannot aim at her 
target since none of the parts of the bow, nor the arrows, nor her skill with the bow coerce or 
necessitate her to take aim and shoot. 
146 EN II 06b36-ll 07a3 . Also, the word 'patience ' here is used not in the sense that Aristotle treats of his 
exploration of "time" as an impediment that must be overcome (EN I 094b27ff, 1142a 12-20, and 1147a 17ff. Also, 
De Gen. An 735a I 0-11; CF, & Phys. 255a34f.; 255b 11-1 3), rather, I use this word to refer to the simple ability to 
listen carefully and participate in lectures and debates (most notably political and philosophical), which can be 
lengthy and taxing on one's rational control. 
147 P.6. 
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2.4: Possessing Virtue 
It is not unreasonable to see virtue as the mean of reason, given the importance of 
reasonable deliberation and particular act, a fact that Aristotle argues throughout the EN, 
referring to happiness in accordance with "perfect virtue", indicating that the virtuous person 
must maintain the virtuous behavior for the most part in order to become (and be) happy. 148 
Since the emphasis is ultimately upon choice of the most virtuous action from all possible 
actions, reason itself must be perfected in order to choose the virtuous action successfully. It 
follows that, since all humans can become virtuous, then all humans can also be autonomous 
agents in the same manner, given choice is an element of the perfection of reason. 
Since virtue is not a natural faculty of the soul like sight or hearing or even like 
generation and nutrition, but a "hexis", or "disposition" or "state of character", then it must be 
acquired. This acquisition is, as mentioned previously, a kind of self-training. It is important to 
understand that hexis does not mean "potentiality", rather, hexis points out the "possession" of 
that which enables; so, with respect to virtue, hexis points to the fact that virtue can be acquired 
or possessed, or not. 149 We can also infer that the excellence pointed out in the term arete can 
now be modified to include hexis: thus, arete as excellence is a possession that can enable one to 
achieve one's telos or not. This shift then accords with what has been discussed concerning 
vi1tue and the mean, in that individuals must act for themselves. That said, we must now explore 
the relation between knowledge and reason. 
Given what we have discussed so far, virtue is a kind of knowledge; it must be 
deliberated upon and in part gained and then maintained through life experience. Aristotle 
supports this argument by emphasizing the importance of knowledge in the act of rational 
148 EN 1114b26- 1115a3. 
149 See also P.35. 
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deliberation and virtuous activity. As mentioned previously, if virtue were not knowledge, but an 
innate faculty of the soul, we would all be born virtuous (and be happy), before engaging in 
virtuous acts; in fact however, one must practice virtuous activity to become virtuous: 
"For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, 
e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too 
we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by 
doing brave acts ... it is from the same causes and by the same means that every 
virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from 
playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced .. . For if this 
were not so, there would have been no need of a teacher, but all men would have 
been born good or bad at their craft. This then, is the case with the virtues also ... 
[thus] states of character arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we 
exhibit must be of a certain kind . . . it makes no small difference, then, whether 
we form habits of one kind or another from our very youth; it makes a very great 
difference, or rather all the difference." 150 
In other words, repeatedly engaging in virtuous activities in order to form the proper 
habits will inculcate virtue within the character of whoever enacts them. The more one engages 
in virtuous actions, the more the habit becomes inculcated, then the more one becomes capable 
of engaging in virtuous actions without having to pause to deliberate about them before enacting 
them. That said one always stands ready to justify one's actions. Thus, through habit is the 
human soul made virtuous. 151 
Virtue points to habitually engaging in actions that make one virtuous; but more 
specifically, to properly choosing and engaging in the right acts, with the right objects (if 
applicable), with the right people, in the right ways, for the right reasons, at the right times.152 If 
we push the implications further, we see that virtuous actions "contain" virtue, since the 
individual becomes more virtuous upon doing them. So, a virtuous act is only virtuous when 
150 EN 1103a34-1103b2, and 1103b7ff. 
151 EN II 03a 14-20. This also means that the human is capable of affecting their inner principle of motion and rest, 
in that they supply for themselves new states of motion and rest through the perfection of ethical acts, or virtue 
(P.30). 
152 EN 1106bl5-23 . 
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applied properly (right ways at the right times) and when the individual is aware of his actions 
after having chosen them. It is important to see that while the activity itself is virtuous it does 
not literally "contain" virtue as a vessel contains water, rather, this is a metaphor to indicate that 
the action is capable of affecting the individual; i.e., making one virtuous and subsequently 
happy. 
2.5: Non-Coercive Knowledge 
Given that virtue relies upon knowledge we must ascertain whether knowledge is 
coercive or not. If knowledge were coercive, then any virtuous activity (indeed, any activity) 
demonstrated by humanity would be nothing more than the nonnative instinctive behavior 
demonstrated by all other animals as determined by nature. In this section I shall argue that 
knowledge does not normatively coerce, or in any way force, bind, or limit the individual to act, 
rather, it allows for action. 153 In order to see this we must now consider ignorance and 
knowledge. 
I contend that there are two kinds of ignorance: willful and natural. Both elements are 
expressed as actions and, as such, stand in accord with what we have said concerning Aristotle's 
conception of substantial activity. That is, both willful ignorance and natural ignorance represent 
both un-virtuous actions and the lack of virtuous action respectively. 
Willful ignorance occurs when the individual knowingly chooses and engages in actions 
that are un-virtuous, that are the inappropriate goods given their circumstances (i.e. not the right 
actions at the right times in the right ways, etc.). Such a person is motivated by the irrational 
elements of his soul for the lesser goods, and enacts selfishness or some other such vice. Natural 
153 The Aristotelian tradition, from Socrates on, stands for the proposition that knowledge a llows one to act, and can 
make an individual free. This is the kernel of their rationalist, " intellectual ist", and eth ical thought as it shapes 
western philosophy down to Kant and beyond. 
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ignorance occurs when the individual does not know what he needs to know in order to choose 
the best action concerning his circumstances, and thus never has the option to act virtuously in 
the first place. That said, such a person might still select the most virtuous option avai lable, but 
that intent does not change the fact he has chosen to enact the wrong action at the wrong time in 
the wrong way. In shott, such a person's heart is said to "be in the right place", but has yet to 
achieve arete. If we apply this distinction between the willfully and naturally ignorant to 
Aristotle's understanding of virtue, a willfully or naturally ignorant individual would be 
considered to be incontinent (inconsistent), but they are of course differentiated by their intent to 
aim at the chief good. 
Knowledge informs our ability to act by giving us a variety of options, informed by our 
education in, and of, the world (science) and life experience. With greater knowledge more 
options become available to us from which to choose the best good and most virtuous actions, 
given the circwnstances (right choices enacted in the right ways at the right time). If knowledge 
compelled us to choose the most virtuous actions consistently and at all times, then it would 
result in all rational individuals being happy and virtuous people, which is clearly not the case.154 
It follows that knowledge always presents us with the means to choose virtuously in light of the 
human hexis of virtue, which may not be achieved when attempted. This is then demonstrated in 
the very existence of the inconsistent or incontinent individual ( akrates, or person of weak 
will).l 55 
The inconsistent individual who desires to fulfill only his immediate pleasures, who has 
154 This argument accords with what I have said concerning virtue not being a human faculty, given humans would 
already been virtuous and happy to the greatest extent possible (P.37). The parallel here is that knowledge, if it 
necessitated action, would result in one gaining virtue and happiness the moment one gained virtuous knowledge. 
But since we have already established that virtue must be enacted, this is proven fa lse. 
155 It should be noted that opinion also plays a role in our process of decision-making. That is, just like knowledge, 
opinion has the capacity to inform us on the possible results of our actions. 
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habituated himself to constantly make such choices that deviate from the mean into excess or 
defect is, in effect, allowing his irrational desires to be viewed as virtuous. Such a person, 
insofar as he is willfully ignorant, is the perfect example of an individual capable of ignoring the 
knowledge that excess or defect leads to vice. That said, the individual who is naturally ignorant 
is simply hindered by his lack of knowledge, but who may become virtuous if he gains the 
appropriate knowledge/training. 
I contend that knowledge of virtue and happiness is a non-coercive knowing that presents 
the individual with a kind of moral urging ( disposition/hexis) that, if ethically adhered to, 
proportionately increases our natural tendency to act virtuously with each virtuous enactment. 
This moral urging is not coercive; rather, it acts as an incentive reinforcing the choice for 
virtuous activity by pointing to the goal of virtue: happiness. Since the act is a good and an end 
in itself it follows that Aristotle 's conception of virtue is not a mere utilitarian or consequentialist 
account of human action since this incentive is, simultaneously, for both act and its goal. 156 If, as 
Aristotle asserts, a virtuous act is both pleasant and noble and leads to happiness, then why 
wouldn't we enact it? The distinction is this: the virtuous person would enact it, while the person 
striving to become virtuous would attempt to enact it, and while the incontinent person would 
probably ignore it. It follows that while knowledge urges us to act virtuously we have, given the 
nature of our souls, the capacity (hexis) to act counter to it. 
2.6: Power and Responsibility 
We must, therefore, explore Aristotle's conception of humanity as causally explained by, 
and consisting in an act. Aristotle emphasizes the importance of the act of virtuous reasoning as 
156 EN I 094a, and 1140a 1-24 (that making and acting are different). 
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enabling one to achieve happiness: 
"With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our account is 
in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it makes, perhaps, no 
small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state 
of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any 
good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the 
activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting 
well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest 
that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are 
victoriouv, so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and the good things 
in life." 15 
At least two inferences may be drawn from this passage, both of which are fundamental 
to Aristotle's thought. First, without action the individual cannot achieve happiness, since 
happiness is itself an act. The individual must act as a self-sufficient agent in order to achieve 
happiness. The responsibility of achieving happiness is therefore placed in the lap of the 
individual, which accords well with what we have concluded concerning substance in chapter 
one, and virtue in the previous sections of this chapter; i.e. , that all individuals move, change, 
and act for themselves in their own ways as per their final cause. The second inference to be 
drawn is that happiness cannot be achieved, according to Aristotle, through thought alone: the 
idea of happiness, virtue, and the good are empty without action. 158 Thus, it follows that thought 
as virtuous must be enacted as the human good, and that such virtuous actions are a kind of 
met hex is of thought and action with happiness (the good) as purpose. 
There are three activities in which one can see virtue/an~te demonstrated within the world 
by the individual: through virtuous living (involving everyday acts in living the good life), in 
political acts, and finally, in teaching and learning scientific and philosophic knowledge. This 
third mode of expression may be the most influential, particularity in combination with political 
157 EN I 098b30-l 099a6. 
158 EN I 096b I 6-26. This notion is certainly taken up by Kant, in his assertion that conceptions without intuition are 
blind. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason AS I, 875) 
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acts. That is, it is clear from Aristotle's writings as a whole that, those who are virtuous 
constantly strive to perfect their scientific knowledge of the world and engage with others in the 
love of wisdom (philosophy). 
Aristotle's explanations and arguments, while informative on the nature of goods and 
happiness, are general even if they are practical. Reading the EN, one is reminded of Aristotle 's 
explanations of substance. His generality is both satisfying and frustrating: that is, since the 
individual substance can only be understood individually, so too virtue and happiness can only 
be understood as practiced by the individual, individually. 159 This is especially seen in the 
individuals acting for themselves for their own happiness. 
Aristotle spends a good deal of time exploring various specific interpretations of virtue 
and happiness, but he also points out that virtuous actions are pleasant. That is, since happiness 
brings pleasure in itself then such actions are also virtuous and noble. 16° For Aristotle, a good 
person will judge well virtuous actions that bring about pleasure and nobility, subsequently 
benefiting the most from them.161 As mentioned previously, this element of judgment is key to 
the possibility of autonomous agency, since freedom is so often considered to consist in the 
combination of free choice with the ability to enact the choice without external interference. But 
the question we must address now is whether Aristotle considers the individual to be a free agent 
with respect to judgment. 
In Book III of the EN, Aristotle points out that there is an element of responsibility in 
virtue that we must now consider. Aristotle explains that the consequences of our actions, be 
they positive or negative, can be characterized with the distinction between involuntary and 
159 P.2llf. 




voluntary actions. For Aristotle, involuntary actions are either grounded in ignorance, where the 
agents are not aware of their actions and/or the purposes of said actions, or when the agent is 
forced or coerced into action by others: in both cases the principle motion (cause) lies outside of 
the agent performing the action. 162 Voluntary actions originate within the agent, thus the agents 
are their own principle of motion and are aware of both their actions and their purpose (i.e., as 
chosen from deliberated knowledge). 163 
Aristotle does not address the distinction between involuntary and voluntary acts merely 
to delimit the state's power of punishing its people (though it certainly is of great importance), 
rather, he points out that the individual is morally responsible for certain kinds of actions, which 
can lead to both praise and punishment. An element of autonomy is thereby present, in that if all 
actions are involuntary then no morally acceptable punishment could exist. Further, this element 
of voluntary choice is distinctly individual; given it is the agent who chooses to enact choices, 
which can therefore only be performed by individual substances, specifically, substances capable 
of rational thought. 164 
From what we have discussed thus far concerning choice, it seems that we may have 
found autonomous human agency given it is clear that humans are free agents with respect to 
their judgments. But is the voluntary choice that enacts potentially virtuous actions proof of 
autonomous agency, or is it, conversely, proof that there is a normative human capacity, not 
unlike the beaver 's instinctive drive to build a dam, that causes us to deliberate? Certainly there 
is an element of choice involved when the beaver selects a good place to build its dam. Still, as 
Aristotle has pointed out, the faculty of reason within the human nous sets humanity apart from 
162 EN 1109b30- 1110a20. 
163 EN lllla20-25 . 
164 EN I I I I b 14- I 7. 
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animals, in that it is the human capacity to reflect upon and analyze one's choices using reason 
(rational deliberation) to determine the best course of action, including the capacity to alter (if 
need be) one's actions according to circumstances. 165 
I firmly agree with Aristotle's position, in that it involves the power to enact. Aristotle 
points out that, ultimately, individuals deliberate about those actions that are within their power 
to enact. 166 When Aristotle says "power", he specifically means those actions by which the 
individual has the capacity to affect change in/with. Since choice originates within the individual 
human, based upon one's own purposive deliberation, then it follows that, for Aristotle, the 
individual is a source of efficient change. 167 Further, Aristotle asserts that since humans only 
deliberate about that which they have the power to change, we actually only deliberate about the 
means by which we achieve our goals. 168 This change is, itself, tempered by virtue since the 
human capacity to change, and to be changed, is driven by, firstly, the normative motion of 
nature according to their being (substance), and it is, secondly, guided by one's nous through the 
exercise of reason. It follows that the origin of purposive change concerns that which we have 
the power to affect change in and that it originates within the human nous, which is specifically 
demonstrable in human actions (changes) that one enacts. 169 It follows then that virtue and vice 
are within our power to affect change. 170 
To briefly summarize what has been said so far, we can see that virtuous action manifests 
the harmony of knowledge and practical activity with the right objects with the right people, in 
the right ways, for the right reasons, at the right times as embodied and enacted within the world 
165 P.45ff. 
166 EN Ill b26-30, and 1112a 19-1112b. 
167 EN ll39al6-ll39bl4. 
168 EN lll2b9-lll3a5. 
169 EN lll3a3-14. 
170 EN 1113al-13. 
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by the individual person defined as person. Virtuous action is characterized as a unique 
purposively deliberated and voluntary human excellence (arete) involving that which we have 
the power to affect. Virtue is the arete of the mutual participation, the methexis, of the irrational 
and rational elements of the soul, in that vi1tue represents the perfection one has attained when 
one's rational element of the soul guides the irrational element in its desiring the good. 
Since humans are causally autonomous with respect to their being, and since this implies 
that humans have the power to enact change in themselves, to become virtuous, then it follows 
that humans are rational autonomous agents with respect to initiating and establishing virtue for 
themselves according to their being. Therefore, rational autonomous human agency is a 
principle of human freedom within Aristotle's conception of virtue, and it is an element of the 
human soul given it is the innate human principle of motion and rest dealing specifically with 
rational (phronesis) action and rest. 171 In this sense, the emphasis on practical action/rest is 
thereby a complementary hexis to the innate motion and rest that is the foundation of human 
beings as living substances. Since all humans can become autonomous agents to the extent that 
all are capable of reasonable deliberation, it follows that the more knowledge one has, both 
scientific and philosophical, the more one is capable of choosing virtuous actions, gaining 
practical wisdom, becoming happy, and flourishing. 172 
If rational autonomous human agency is a kind of knowing, we might ask the logical 
question, why is it so difficult to identify and justify? I contend that rational autonomous human 
agency is difficult to recognize, both in Aristotle and in general, because it is epagogic. As 
mentioned previously, the term epagogic refers to the difficulty in recognizing that which is most 
171 Physics Book II , Chapter 2 . 
172 It is now clear that a human can indeed achieve their own autonomy, as first discussed in chapter one (P.22), 
given virtue can be acquired. 
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obvious, or most evident. 173 So, recognition of rational autonomous human agency is difficult 
because it is so obviously an aspect of the human soul that it does not immediately strike us as 
existing. Our inattentiveness reduces the power of rational autonomous human agency to mere 
judging, resulting in the mistaken assumption that the choices we make are so mundane that we 
do not attribute any level of significance to them. We tend to over-complicate both our capacity 
to, and understanding of, rational autonomous agency; i.e., I contend that we often assume that if 
rational autonomous human agency existed then it would only be demonstrable in those choices 
whose results caused a significant, perhaps drastic, affect on our lives. This is simply not the 
case, as paying more attention allows us to recognize what we already see. 
It must also be noted that, for Aristotle, speaking at length about rational autonomous 
human agency simply does not make sense. Insofar as agency exists for Aristotle it simply is not 
productive to speak about it as being a distinct principle within the human soul, somehow 
separate yet related to deliberation and judging. Just as focusing too much on the form or matter 
of substance is counterproductive, since they are separable in thought only, so too is focusing too 
much on rational autonomous human agency. If one focuses too much on any one capacity of 
the human soul one is tempted to debate if the soul has parts, or is a harmony of patts, which is 
not the case: the soul is a unified whole. Further, just as the intellectual and moral virtues need 
to be honed to arete/excellence, so too rational autonomous human agency: it is through the 
activity of becoming virtuous that rational autonomous human agency is perfected in its 
application. 
That said, we can still learn much from exploring rational autonomous agency as a hexis 
of the human soul. For an example of the benefits of exploring rational autonomous human 
173 P.29-30, and note 69. 
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agency we must look to a passage of Waterlow's text Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle's 
Physics. Waterlow briefly discusses the point that change, for Aristotle, is a "concrete event in 
which the agency of an individual and the patiency of another are distinguishable but inseparable 
aspects". 174 Waterlow's position, that the parts of an event are separable in thought only, accords 
with what Aristotle has said concerning substance. However, Water! ow goes on to state that the 
conception of change as an event ultimately means that there is no such thing as actual agency 
and patiency: 
"If we and Aristotle find this account incredible the reason, I suggest, does not lie 
with the concept of change as such, but with the structure of the concepts we use 
to describe our own practical activities. Suppose we intend to produce some 
change in an object other then ourselves. Then in the event, if all goes well, we do, 
and take ourselves to be doing, what we already intended. If we describe what we 
are doing while doing it, the description differs only in tense from the verbal 
expression of the prior intention. So in seeing ourselves as executing the intention, 
we see the actual happening as ofthe same logical structure as the intention itself. 
But in the intention, which proceeded the change, the object-to-be-changed 
figured as something distinct from ourselves. This even when the change is actual 
it continues to figure as distinct. In short, when the change is one that we take 
ourselves to bring about in an external object, we cannot primarily view it as a 
concrete event undifferentiated into the aspects of agency and patiency. The point 
of view of the voluntary agent is one from which the "halves" already present 
themselves as distinct." 175 
At first glance, Waterlow's position would seem to relegate rational autonomous human 
agency to a psychological perception, but this is not the case. While I wholly agree with 
Waterlow's position concerning change as an event, to which her argument is completely 
committed to with respect to the motion of change itself, it must be noted that she is unconcerned 
with the human soul nor virtue as if relates to motion and change: her position is concerned 
primarily with the Physics and its associated texts. Let us balance the above quote with 
Aristotle's assertion that "it is absurd to suppose that purpose is not present because we do not 
174 Waterlow, Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle's Physics 200. 
175 Waterlow, Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle's Physics 202-3 . 
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observe the agent deliberating" 176. Insofar as Waterlow's analysis of change is correct, once we 
take into account the human soul and everything I have stated thus far concerning non-coercive 
knowledge and the power of the individual human to enact purpose, we clearly see that rational 
autonomous human agency is not merely a psychological perception of change. Keeping to 
Waterlow's example in the above quote, we see that the intent to undertake an act by the virtuous 
individual (to produce a change in an external object) occurs because of rational autonomous 
agency, and that the analysis of the events occurs as Waterlow describes it; i.e., focusing on the 
change as an event rather than on a single aspect ofthe event itself(agency). This becomes clear 
when we remember that knowledge is non-coercive and that rational autonomous human agency 
is an element of the human soul as a complementary hexis of the innate human principle of 
motion and rest. 
Since human rational autonomous agency is a complementary principle of the innate 
human principle of motion and rest, then it fo llows that human actions are demonstrative of this 
fact. This is so for two reasons: first, by simply its enactment autonomous action enables the 
inculcation of virtuous habits in the potentially virtuous individual, and helps to sustain virtue in 
the viriuous person. Secondly, it does not constrain the individual to make a particular choice or 
even to choose at all. Rather, rational autonomous human agency allows the individual to enact 
his or her choices, thereby making each autonomous action an instance of human autonomy. 
Thus, human rational autonomous agency is an arc he of freedom to initiate movement and rest 
(insofar as and so long as it is tempered and guided by reason), and that freedom to choose 
completes the human soul's own activity (telos). 
It follows that insofar as humans have an innate principle of motion and rest, humans are 
176 Physics 199b27-33. Discussed on P.25 . 
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capable of affecting it: that is, purposively guiding it towards virtuous rational goals that will 
lead to happiness. Thus, humans can acquire a degree of excellence with respect to their own 
being that is their own being. Specifically, human rational autonomous agency is the unification 
(methexis) of reason and the innate principle of motion and rest as a uniquely human telos. 
Further, it follows that rational autonomous agency is a distinctly natural hexis of humanity. This 
is the differentiating factor that separates humanity from all other animals, in that no other 
animal, according to Aristotle, can purposively reflect upon its actions using reason, learn from 
their actions and subsequently perfect them in order to achieve happiness and the good. 
It follows that humanity is not completely normatively limited nor bound by nature with 
respect to its being since it can change (perfect) it through the activity of its reasonable sou1. 177 
This fact is made clear when we consider moral responsibility: we cannot and will not hold a 
beaver morally responsible for the damage caused by building a dam in a river, but we can and 
will hold a human morally responsible for any and all damage he inflicts that result from his 
voluntary actions that are proven to have been ignorant or unethica1. 178 
In summation, autonomous agency is embodied in every virtuous act in so far as it is 
completed as Aristotle prescribes: the right actions at the right times, and so forth. Thus, rational 
autonomous human agency is the arete of reasonable (phronesis) activity that unifies and 
integrates (methexis) all virtuous activities as truly virtuous. Since knowledge is non-coercive 
then the potentially virtuous person can choose not to act on his or her knowledge at any time 
177 With respect to substance, it should be noted that this change is not substantial change, that is, humans cannot 
change themselves to become non-human. This change is non-substantial change, which is the ability to affect 
change(s) in substantial properties and not substance per se. 
178 Aristotle says as much when he asserts that we will hold a person responsible for his illegal actions while drunk 
given he made the incontinent choice to get drunk rather than adhere to the virtues of moderation and justice (EN 
1113b30-III4a8). 
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thus, it is reasonable to assert that when the individual does enact his or her virtuous knowledge 
successfully he or she is demonstrating two interesting facts: first, the individual is expressing an 
instance of their own rational autonomous agency, and second, such instances can be called 
enacted knowledge. Since rational autonomous human agency is based on virtuous knowledge, 
and since it follows that rational autonomous human agency is perfected in its application, we 
can conclude that rational autonomous hw11an agency is perfected through virtue. 
Since substance achieves itself, then it follows that the individual human is, in principle, 
capable of achieving his or her own rational autonomous agency. This action is not a self-change 
per se,· rather, it is a self-becoming wherein the individual has shaped himself more fully as 
himself. 179 This substantial self-becoming is analogous to the flower growing from seed to full 
bloom; the potentiality virtuous person grows into adulthood and then fertilizes his mind and 
hones his virtue in order to become himself more fully. 180 
But the analogy is not wholly adequate. In a sense, the process of becoming virtuous is a 
change when one considers that the unvirtuous man has changed into a virtuous man. But the 
process is more properly understood as a becoming, in this case a substantial self-becoming, a 
telic self-completion, in that the process involves change characterized as habitual ethical 
reflections and the perfection of virtuous actions (overcoming failure) with the purposive goal of 
becoming happy for the sake of happiness. 
Since this self-becoming is an individual process undertaken individually, then it is 
removed from the normative processes of nature that determines the growth of the flower. This 
becomes apparent when we recognize that rational human autonomous agency is a hexis of the 




and rest. The human is not completely bound by the normative motions of nature, and, unlike 
the flower or the beaver, the human's rational soul demonstrates the capacity that the human is, in 
principle, free to enact deliberated choice informed by non-coercive knowledge. Thus, rational 
human autonomous agency is an expression of the virtuous human telos. 
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Chapter Three: Issues & Implications 
3.1: Virtue as a Techni 
Now that we have found rational autonomous human agency we must discuss several 
important issues and implications: A) how virtue, as a human activity, relates to art or techne, B) 
the existence of slavery, C) how rational autonomous human agency, the good, and virtue are 
related with specific reference to Aristotle, D) moral failure (akrasia), and lastly, E) the existence 
of novel motion. How virtue relates to art or techne will complete this section while the other 
issues will be addressed in the remaining four sections of this chapter respectively. 
There is a linguistic oddity, one that Gadamer explains quite well, that will lead to a 
crucial clarification of Aristotle's theory of moral education. Given the focus on actions with 
which phronesis (practical wisdom) is concerned, and what Aristotle has said about the good 
(that at which all actions aim), we need to explore how practical actions operate as final cause of 
the individual person, for whose substantial sake these acts function. Gadamer places a lot of 
emphasis on this point: "the knowledge of the hand worker plays such a paradigmatic role in any 
kind of knowing at all that language conforms to it". 18 1 That is, in relation to the justification of 
actions (i.e., which actions are deliberated upon and then chosen to be the most virtuous), one 
invariably defends one's reasons using practical and scientific language. Aristotle uses a 
metaphor of a balance scale weighing both good and bad events in a life, where too many bad 
events can "crush" and "maim" happiness, but a virtuous person faces such an unbalanced scale 
with virtuous nobility. 182 In other words, if questioned, one justifies one's actions to others with 
181 Gadamer, The Good 35. 
182 EN II 00b22-32, and II 02b 15-24 (cf.) The focus on physical metaphor, that of one's face turned to boldly 
confront bad events accords with the virtue of courage, while the actions of crushing and maiming happ iness evoke 
visceral emotional and intellectual responses to pain. Since pain and bad events wi ll always occur in life, one sees 
the benefit of accepting such events as inevitable and enduring them as nobly as possible given we cannot stop them 
from happening. In many respects, these metaphors accord with Socrates' analogy of philosophy and health; i.e., 
Morrison 67 
an eye towards the actions themselves being good, and resulting in the chief good. 
This language use can often confuse the reader of Aristotle trying to understand how 
Aristotle conceives deliberation and learning. It can appear that virtue is in fact a techne, 
particularly when Aristotle argues that techne is indicative of a deliberative agent as primary 
cause and that virtue is acquired. 183 While it is easy to reduce phronesis to a mere techne, one 
loses crucial nuances in the process. Whereas a techne can be learned, mastered, and taught, 
phronesis is learned based on the individual doing first, then learning and then perfecting (as 
opposed to techne where one learns first then does the action), characterized entirely by one's 
own final cause (choosing one 's own good).184 This accords with the fact that humans can 
produce themselves given they have an inner principle of motion and rest. 185 
This final cause is at once universally common to all humans (achieving the good and 
becoming happy), and also, in the manner in which the individual achieves it, to be distinguished 
from techne by the actions each individual undertakes to achieve his or her own goals. Not only 
does one engage in acts in order to learn them, but each individual must achieve his or her own 
goods in his or her own ways. Thus, virtue and happiness are judged on an individual basis, 
while in contrast, a techne is a universal (unchanging) process that creates a product (a 
mechanism). One person cannot teach another how best to achieve virtue and happiness in his or 
her life; one must do this for one's self, pru1icularly given that the circumstances around one's 
life can change, requiring the application of different goods. Famine and war, for example, can 
drastically change the acts one would normally perform. This certainly contests the sophistic 
stru1dpoint, and was the source of much heated debate as Plato 's Prot agoras shows. 
that philosophy is preparation for death. 
183 P.22ff (art as a product of deliberative agency). 
184 EN 1103a26- 1103b22. 
185 Physics 192b l2-32. 
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While this accords with Aristotle's conception of individual substance, there is some 
reason to consider phronesis as a techne, or at the very least, to view them as less than total 
opposites or entirely exclusive of one another. That is, phronesis could be argued to produce a 
product (virtue and happiness) in the same manner that the blacksmith makes a horseshoe. But 
then we would have an individualized techne, rather than a single universal technique for 
achieving happiness. Thus, phronesis is simultaneously a techne of the soul, and yet not 
exclusively so, since the product of phronesis is considered the most permanent, complete and 
universal human act, while techne implies a product that is temporary. Eventually the horseshoe 
will wear out, but happiness endures. 186 And yet, there still seems to be an accord, given both 
produce a product of use: so, perhaps we could call phronesis (and subsequently virtue) the m-ete 
of techne, given that its product (virtue and happiness) is permanent. In a sense, we could say 
that individual humans can produce their own autonomous agency insofar as they can be viriuous. 
Ultimately however, to see phronesis as a techne is to miss the crucially important nuances of 
virtue. 
With respect to education, therefore, in so far as virtue is informed by scientific 
knowledge of the world in much the same way that techne informs the artisan, this knowledge 
does provide a foundation of information that the individual 's choices can use for justification, 
that contrasts with, (yet parallels) the training the artisan receives in techne. This then 
emphasizes the role of self-learning in the process of acquiring virtue, and is crucial as also 
emphasizing that virtue is a hexis of the human soul. 
186 EN IIOObl0-22. 
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3.2: Agency and Slavery 
Since humans can become rational autonomous human agents, then we must now try to 
understand how Aristotle conceives of the "natural slave". The term 'natural slave' immediately 
calls to mind an individual that is incapable of being free, and therefore requires our attention. In 
so far as any person could become a slave through the circumstance of one's life, such as 
indentured servitude or enslavement through war, there seems to be a possibility for 
contradiction in the assertion that there exists a separate "sub-class" or "group" of humanity as 
being somehow naturally inclined to slavery. Of course, Aristotle distinguishes such 
enslavement (which he regards as wrong) from the condition of natural slaves. 
In the Politics Aristotle argues that some humans are born to rule while others are born to 
be ruled, and that this is not only a necessity but also expedient. 187 Generally speaking, Aristotle 
argues that in the same way that the rational aspect of the human soul can control the irrational, 
some individuals are naturally subjugated by others; this subjugation benefits those subjugated as, 
like tamed animals, the subjugated are cared-for and allowed to engage in activities for which 
they are best suited (e.g. physical activities and labour). 188 When Aristotle relates natural slaves 
with the irrational aspect of the soul and masters to the rational, Aristotle is inferring four facts: 
first, that natural slaves are incontinent individuals, second, their intellectual capacities are 
highly limited, thirdly, that that their irrationality requires controlling, and lastly, that this 
coercive control is natural. 
Like the irrational aspect of the soul, however, the natural slave is not completely without 
reason, given he still engages in acts he deems good. That said, since the natural slave Jacks a 
187 Politics 1254a20-23 . 
188 Politics 1254b l-1255a2. Aristotle goes on to say that this relation between ruler and ruled mirrors the very 
structure of reality itself, and is indicative of a "ruling principle". T his is evidenced by the controlling powers of 
reason within the human mind as it controls the soul 's various desires, or is in turn subjugated by them in the m ind 
of an irrational or inconsistent person ( 1254a20ff). 
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paideia he also lacks the opportunity to acquire virtue, much less successfully apply distinct 
virtuous acts consistently. Thus, the natural slave is an incontinent individual because, without 
intellectual reason, he is unable to gain virtue. The master who subjugates the natural slave 
provides the rational control that the natural slave lacks. Given that the natural slave is still 
human, it follows for Aristotle that the natural slave must be coerced into living as good a life as 
he is able. 189 In this sense then, Aristotle is also asserting that natural slaves, as incontinent 
individuals, need to be forcefully morally oriented by their masters "for their own good", so to 
speak. 
Aristotle further argues that the only activities that the natural slave excels in are physical. 
When an individual can only accomplish physical tasks, then such an individual will benefit by 
being controlled by individuals who are fully rational and ill suited to physicallabour(s). 
"When there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men 
and animals (as is the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who 
can do nothing better) the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them 
as it is for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who 
can be, and therefore is, another 's, and he who participates in rational principle 
enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle, is a slave by nature."190 
The natural slave then is one who understands reason, or the rational principle, enough to 
know that he is not fit to rule over others, and is thereby more naturally suited to being ruled by 
those who have reason. More simply, because the natural slave has not benefited from a paideia 
and is not prosperous, at least intellectually, and is aware he cannot perform complex or subtle 
reasoning, he knows he cannot help to control neither household nor city as either a master or 
politician, respectively. Subsequently, Aristotle asserts that just as a horse will accept the 
189 Politics 1254a20-23, and EN 1140a25ff. 
190 Politics 1254b 15-22. 
Morrison 7 1 
mastery of its owner, the natural slave's instinct is to obey its master. 191 
The natural slave does not so much present a "problem" that needs addressing so much as 
it is an issue that needs to be viewed from the perspective of rational autonomous human agency, 
given that the latter has now been made more explicit. I would argue that, in principle, the 
natural slave is only such due to a natural defect: they are incapable of achieving intellectual 
virtue, and therefore unable to achieve virtue and happiness. This is supported by the fact that 
the slave is a mobile extension of the master's body and soul, and thereby must be treated with 
the utmost respect and care. 192 Therefore, albeit limited by his or her specific defect, the natural 
slave is still human given he or she still has reason, can deliberate in order to make judgments, 
and can become content, if not happy. 
3.3: The Archer 
How rational autonomous agency, the good, and virtue are related can perhaps be more 
easi ly understood with a slight modification of Aristotle's visual metaphor of the Archer. 193 The 
bow is philosophical knowledge (of the good and happiness), the quiver contains the supply of 
understanding we possess of the world (training, schooling, etc.) and its benefits (patience, 
experience), the arrows are individual acts of virtue which we enact by aiming towards the target 
(telos), and which we draw from the quiver using rational deliberation (phronesis). Autonomous 
agency is the principle that allows the archer to take aim (telos), and when the whole movement 
flows together from drawing and releasing the arrow to striking the target, the archer is 
displaying virtue (an~te, excellence). The archer firing symbolizes knowledge being enacted 
19 1 Politics 125422- 1255a2. 
192 Politics 11 55b4- 15 . 
193 EN 1094a l8 ff. 
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within the world: i.e., the movement, indeed the archer, becomes an embodiment of virtue 
(becomes virtuous). Thus the individual archer has enacted virtue at the right time for the right 
reason in the right way, etc. 
The archer (the potentially virtuous person) is aiming not for the center of the target, the 
"bull 's eye", though that is obviously a part of the entire movement itself, but rather the archer is 
aiming for perfection of the entire action itself (the drawing and firing of the bow) that represents 
the individual's summum bonum (the highest good), as that which is the best action to enact at 
the time. The archer aims at what Aristotle calls the "mark" ("skopos" in Greek), which Aristotle 
explains as a moral landmark that guides the entire movement. Simply put, the archer (the 
phronimos) uses the intention (the choice) of the act and its entirety and attempts to perfect its 
enactment in the world .194 
If the archer misses the center yet strikes the target then she has still achieved a good 
virtuously, but perhaps not the best good. That there is an element ofunceriainty in the 
enactment that prevents the archer from being perfect in all things at all times is expected and 
natural. That is, in so far as the archer is skilled, wind and environment are factors, as well as 
unforeseen circumstances can affect the outcome. Further, despite the fact that virtue is an 
excellence ( ar·ete) and a kind of perfection, we must accept that humans are not perfect, and 
cannot be perfect: sometimes we miss. Thus, when bad things happen either because we miss 
our target or due to events outside of our control, we must accept such circumstances virtuously 
in order to prevent our happiness from being crushed. 
Thus, the archer understands that, should they miss either pariially or completely she will 
draw again, learning from her mistake in the right way andre-aiming for the right reasons. For 
194 Politics 1254a20-23, and EN 1140a25ff 
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each time the archer draws, aims, and fires, she is merging her knowledge and actions into one 
(methexis) fluid movement towards a rationally virtuous good involving both action and rest. 
This movement is unified by the good as goal for the archer's existence, her telos, in that the 
good (bowing) binds the archer, her actions, and her target as one into a virtuous activity. 195 
Each time the action is performed it comes closer and closer to perfection, at least as much as 
humanly possible given context and circumstances; this asymptotic action (multiple variables 
approaching a limit or goal), not only helps the individual become more virtuous but it also 
serves to help define the individual as an individual, as an expression of the self. 
Since autonomous agency is a complementary hexis that enables the archer to be truly 
virtuous, we know that the archer is under no necessitating constraint to enact her knowledge as 
virtuous activity. Because of this, the archer knows that the act is enacted by her for her own 
sake, and not for anything else. In so far as knowledge of the good, of virtue, morally allows for 
such embodied action, the archer is not determined to act. No moral imperative exists that can 
command the archer (or phronimos) to draw an arrow, aim, and loose it at the target. The 
archer chooses to take aim and shoot in virtue of the moral urging contained by her knowledge 
insofar as she, the virtuous person, wishes to remain virtuous. The archer is an example of 
habituated purpose; a purpose which, when refined, guides the individual to vi11uous prosperity. 
The choice determines the act, and where the emphasis must lie. 196 
3.4: Akrasia 
Akrasia or moral failure is, as I have stated in Chapter Two, necessary, and is 
195 By "bowing", I mean the specific motions involving the bow that enables it to be used, especially with respect to 
successive uses involving both motion and rest, particularly the rest between uses of the bow. 
196 EN 1114b18-25. 
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demonstrated in the individual "of weak will" ( akrates ). 197 Exploring the actions of the akrates 
will help to elucidate some of the implications of rational autonomous human agency I am 
addressing in this chapter. This will entail a brief exploration of the so-called "Socrates' paradox" 
from Plato's Protagoras. 
In his work entitled Protagoras, Plato has Socrates assert, "no one does wrong 
knowingly". 198 In the EN, Aristotle comments that Plato is, in some sense, right. 199 The heart of 
the issue for Aristotle is this: if no one does wrong knowingly, and yet all human actions aim at 
some good, with happiness as the chief good, then how is it possible that A) evil is done, and B) 
how is it possible for the incontinent person to exist? Aristotle's solution elegantly accords with 
his conception of the good: either the incontinent individual does not know that his actions are 
evil; or, he is "not exercising the knowledge".200 In either case, Aristotle asserts that the issue is 
not a matter of opinion versus knowledge, given the former is acted upon as though it is the 
latter.201 
With respect to not knowing, the incontinent person can be characterized as naturally 
ignorant given his actions are determined by his lack of knowledge and its proper application. 
This then serves to answer both of the above issues in the Socratic paradox, though not entirely, 
as we must resolve the issue of choice and justification. The incontinent person who chooses not 
to enact his knowledge is willfully ignorant, having irrationally justified their unvirtuous actions 
197 P.52ff. 
198 Pro/agoras 352b,c. 
199 EN 1145b2 1-25, and 11 47b5- 19. 
200 EN 1147a6-8. 
201 EN 1146b23-34. Using the syllogism, Aristotle asserts that the incontinent person is unable to draw proper 
conclusions given they do not use the practical premises and only the universal premises. McKeon writes: " If I am 
to be able to deduce from (a) ' dry food is good for all men ' that ' this food is good for me ', I must have (b) the 
premiss ' I am man ' and (c) the premises ( i) 'x food is dry' , (ii) ' this food is x'. l cannot fail to know (b), and I may 
know (c.i); but if I do not know (c.ii), or know it only ' at the back of my mind ' , I shall not draw the conc lusion" 
(The Basic Works of Aristotle, p.1040). 
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as good. Accordingly, since the incontinent individual has judged that the unvirtuous act(s) he 
does are actually good given his circumstances, he has enacted vice and not vi11ue, opting for 
either excess or defect. It follows that habituation of such choosing will lead to a life ofvice.202 
Thus, we again find that knowledge does not necessitate action, but allows for action. This 
accords with what I have said concerning rational autonomous human agency being a 
complementary hex is of the human soul. 
Given the discussion in chapter two section 2.5 and 2.6 it has become clear that rational 
autonomous human agency carries with it a clear indication of moral responsibility. The concept 
of moral responsibility at work here is intimately entwined with Aristotle's concept of virtue, 
non-coercive knowledge, and the power to enact one's choices. It is important to note that the 
moral responsibility pointed out herein does not involve religion, but rather, a moral urging that 
originates within the self, with the self as goal. It is clear that much more can and should be said 
concerning A/a·asia, but such considerations lay outside the scope of this thesis. For the 
purposes of this thesis it is enough to see that there is moral responsibility in light of rational 
autonomous human agency. 
3.5: Novel Change 
Of all the implications stemming from an Aristotelian rational autonomous human agency, 
I would suggest that the most significant is that which involves Aristotle's conception of 
movement and change within the physical world, within nature. The concept of novel change 
within the physical world is argued by Aristotle to be necessary, in that a series of "fresh starts" 
202 Much more could be sa id, but, for now at least, those arguments lay outside the bounds of my thesis. 
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are required to maintain the motion of nature.203 The issue many philosophers have debated is 
the necessity of novel motion and whether it is even possible: I contend that, for Aristotle, not 
only is it possible but necessary. 
Proving that novel motion exists and stands in relation to rational autonomous human 
agency is actually quite simple, though by no means simplistic: given that autonomous human 
agency allows humans to create artificial objects that do not natmally occur within nature (e.g., 
tools, fine art, etc.), it follows that rational autonomous human agency simultaneously allows for 
and creates novel motion within nature? 04 Since humans are rational autonomous agents that 
have their own inner principles of motion and rest, then it follows that they can produce artificial 
objects that are capable of creating novel action: accordingly humans are somces of novelty. 
To support this argument I offer the following observations. As discussed in chapter one, 
Aristotle explains that kinesis, a "from ... to" movement, can be further explained as a causal 
chain of events or as a series of causal chains; i.e., an originating event causes an effect "A", 
which in tmn causes event "B", then "C", etc., which is most easily seen as the cyclic process of 
efficient cause. Aristotle argues that eventually all causal chains end unless a sustaining event 
occurs or other causal chains occur. Otherwise, given enough time, all motion in nature will 
cease.205 Aristotle himself argued that the activity of the nous as it participates in the world 
creates novel motion (fresh starts) through spontaneous (normative) human action.206 
As I discussed in chapter two, Sara Waterlow takes this position in that the artisan's 
203 Meta 1025b7-ll. 
204 It must be understood that while the activity of nature did not cause the artificial objects to come into being, such 
substances are still subject to the normatively differentially integrating motion of nature. 
205 Meta 1027bl0-14, De Gen. 811, Chp. XI. The primary source of sustaining motion within nature as a whole is 
Aristotle 's conception of the Unmoved Mover. 
206 On Interpretation 89. 
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products create new situations not previously found in nature.207 When a human creates tools he 
or she has caused a significant change within nature that directly affects the motion of applicable 
spontaneous causal chains (e.g., the growth of the tree). Whenever a human uses a tool he or she 
begins a new series of causal chains that have the potential to significantly change the 
environment: such purposive motion shows that humanity has the capacity to be causes in this 
. I . 2o8 purposzve nove motzon. 
Fine art occupies a far better position to prove novel motion, in that fine art is definitely 
not found in nature and yet causes motion. Fine art, such as a painting or a symphony, can, 
regardless of content, cause both spontaneous (normative) and novel motion through the 
emotionally and intellectually charged activity in the mind of the viewer who engages with it. 
That is, fine art can evoke emotions, thoughts, and actions within a viewer that can cause the 
individual to develop intellectually. This development can cause the individual to move towards 
specific aesthetic, moral, political, or personal spontaneous (normative) motions that they never 
would have engaged in, per se. Since novelty arises out of human action then we can 
characterize human novelty as a hexis of the rational autonomous human agent. 
3.6: Summation 
The concept of rational autonomous human agency has, I believe, yielded an intriguing 
series of considerations. While implicit within Aristotle's philosophy, rational autonomous 
human agency is nonetheless an active and necessary component in human rational activity. It is 
a complementary hexis of the human soul that licenses judgments and acts, while simultaneously 
providing a lens through which one can gain insights into human intellectual and political life. 
207 P.23-4. 
208 Not to mention that most humans can and do drastically change their immediate environment, both individually 
and in groups. 
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Rational autonomous human activity serves as a revelatory concept that provides an opportunity 
for new reflections upon novel motion and moral responsibility, proving that humanity has a 
direct impact upon both itself and the world. Returning now to the charges of heresy against 
Aristotle by the sophists Eurymedon and !socrates that I mentioned in the introduction, it is not 
unreasonable to say that Aristotle was exercising virtuous intent in his teachings, but that it was 
the willful (or natural) ignorance displayed by the sophists that resulted in the charges. This 
serves to underscore the crucial lesson of Aristotelian virtue: when bad things happen either 
because we make a mistake or due to events outside of our control, we must accept such 
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